

International Society of East Asian Philosophy 2019 Conference

East Asian Philosophy: Past, Present and Future

Surugadai Campus, Meiji University
1-1 Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-8301, Japan

Program and Abstracts (as of December 13, 2019)


Individual papers: 20 minutes for presentation and 10 minutes for discussion

Organized panels: the moderators will manage time allocation


共催：科研費基盤研究（C）「戦前東アジアにおける哲学：日本の植民地支配の観点から」(19K00117)

後援：明治大学国際連携本部

Direction to Surugadai Campus



Surugadai Campus Map



- | | |
|---|---|
| ① Kishimoto Tatsuo HALL [23F] | ⑧ Meiji University Museum / AKU YOU Memorial Museum [B1F] |
| ② Dining Hall (Sky Lounge Akatsuki) [17F] | ⑨ Shikon Hall [1F] |
| ③ Classroom | ⑩ International Student Office [2F] |
| ④ Hidamari Plaza | ⑪ International Lounge [2F] |
| ⑤ Central Library [1F—B3F] | A Lounge Marronnier |
| ⑥ Liberty Academy | B Café Pensée |
| ⑦ Portrait relief of the founders of Meiji University | C Meidai Mart |

December 14, 2019 (Day 1)

Time	Content	Venue
08:00-08:30	Registration	Room 1163 16F Liberty Tower
08:30-09:00	Opening Ceremony Opening remarks Speaker: SHINO Yoshinobu Chair of the Organizing Committee ISEAP Conference 2019 and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University Moderator: ISHIHARA Yuko Management Committee Member of ISEAP and Assistant Professor, Ritsumeikan University Photo-taking	Room 1163 16F Liberty Tower
09:00-10:10	Keynote Speech I Speaker: LIN Chen-Kuo Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University “Emptiness and Karmic Secularity” Moderator: KAKIUCHI Keiko Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University	
10:10-10:25	Coffee break	Room 1162

Time	Content	Venue
10:25-11:55	Session 1A	Room 1163 16F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Daniel CANARIS , Sun Yat-sen University	
	Different Understandings of Sentence within Yogācāra Buddhism	
	CHOI Seongho , University of Munich	
	<i>Hakanashi, Mujo</i> and beyond: On Karaki Junzo's Theory of Impermanence	
11:55-13:15	CHEUNG Ching-yuen , Chinese University of Hong Kong	
	Is Sino-Japanese Comparative political philosophy possible? -- a case study on the idea of Revolution (革命)	
	WANG Xiaolin , City University of Hong Kong	
11:55-13:15	Lunch	

Time	Content	Venue
10:25-11:55	Session 1B: Organized Panel	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Rika DUNLAP , University of Guam	
	The Confucian Philosophy of The As-if World: The Moral Narrative of Ancestors, Spirits, and <i>Tian</i> in the <i>Analects</i>	
	Rika DUNLAP , University of Guam	
	Gratitude Without Debts	
11:55-13:15	George TSAI , University of Hawaii, Mānoa	
	Shameless Bullies and Shameless Heroes: a Discussion of Shame's Communal Moral Value	
	Jing HU , Concordia University	
11:55-13:15	Lunch	

Time	Content	Venue
10:25-11:25	Session 1C	
	Moderator: Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA , Linfield College	
	The Fullness of Nature: Overcoming Subjectivism in Watsuji's Theory of Fūdo David JOHNSON, Boston College 内田周平と世界初の『中国哲学史』 曹峰 (CAO Feng) , 中国人民大学哲学院	Room 1075 7F Liberty Tower
11:25-13:15	Lunch	

Time	Content	Venue
13:15-14:45	Session 2A	
	Moderator: Yi CHEN , Bond University	
	Movements without thinking in the moment: the implications of skilled performance in the <i>Zhuangzi</i>	Room 1163 16F Liberty Tower
	Foong-Ee PONG , Soochow University	
	Nishida Kitarō as a classical Confucian moral philosopher: Reconfiguring “the actualization of personality”	
	LAM Wing-keung , Dokkyo University 《論語》 仁論的年代歸屬	
	李貴生 (LEE Kwai Sang) , The Education University of Hong Kong	
14:45-15:00	Coffee Break	Room 1162

Time	Content	Venue
13:15-14:45	Session 2B: Organized Panel	
	Moderator: Myeong-seok KIM , Yonsei University	
	Reason and Moral Motivation in Mozi	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
	Myeong-seok KIM , Yonsei University	
	Self-Deception in <i>Mengzi</i> 5A2: On the Permissible Case of Incontinence and the “Happy Case of Action Failure”	
	Joonho LEE , University of Utah	
	How Can <i>Li</i> (禮) Transform an Agent into a ‘Truly’ Moral Person in Xunzi?: Inducing Respect (敬) by Performing <i>Li</i> in the Flesh	
	Jihyun HWANG , Yonsei University	
14:45-15:00	Coffee Break	Room 1071

Time	Content	Venue
13:15-14:45	Session 2C	
	Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA , Ritsumeikan University	
	The Kyoto School and the Problem of Philosophical Modernism Hans Peter LIEDERBACH , Kwansei Gakuin University	Room 1075 7F Liberty Tower
	Reconsidering the “Human” from the Perspective of Confucianism: Interpretive Resemblance between Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun, and Roger T. Ames TATEBE Ryohei , University of Tokyo	
	The Role of the Supernatural in Japanese Confucianism NG Wai Ming , Chinese University of Hong Kong	
14:45-15:00	Coffee Break	Room 1071

Time	Content	Venue
15:00-16:30	Session 3A	Room 1163 16F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Yōsuke TAKEHANA , Otani University	
	Shun's 舜 Ascension to the Throne: Various Interpretations Youngsun BACK , Sungkyunkwan University	
	Mozi's Pantheism and Berkeley Theism: Dissolving (Or Not) the Tension between Consequentialism and Divine Command Theory Michael James HEMMINGSEN , University of Guam	
16:30-16:45	Absolute nothingness and self-identity Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN , Kyoto University	Room 1162
	Coffee Break	

Time	Content	Venue
15:00-16:30	Session 3B: Organized Panel	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Rafal K STEPIEN , Heidelberg University	
	Nāgārjuna and the <i>Twelve Gates Treatise</i> (十二門論): Towards a Chinese Madhyamaka Philosophy Rafal K STEPIEN , Heidelberg University	
	Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language: A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective Chien-hsing HO , Academia Sinica	
16:30-16:45	Being a Mādhyamika Means More Than Just Arguing with Opponents: Purbuchok and Mikyūo Dorje on Experience and Epistemic Instruments John C. POWERS , Deakin University	Room 1071
	Coffee Break	

Time	Content	Venue
15:00-16:30	Session 3C	
	Moderator: Sharon SMALL , East China Normal University	
	Mediating the Self, Experiencing the Dream in the <i>Zhuangzi</i> and <i>Inception</i>	Room 1075 7F Liberty Tower
	Chloe Yuchen YAN , Harvard University	
	A Study on the Images of Guan Yu (關羽) and Gan Ji (于吉) in ehon tsūzoku sangokushi (絵本通俗三国志)	
	William Wai Kim LEE , Chinese University of Hong Kong	
16:30-16:45	Flowing Body, Ubiquitous Mind: Toward an Aesthetics of <i>Qi</i>	
	MITSUMATSU Yukio , Meiji University	
16:30-16:45	Coffee Break	Room 1071

Time	Content		Venue
16:45-18:15	New Perspectives on Xunzi	Session 4B: Organized Panel	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
		Moderator: Jeffrey RIEGEL , University of Sydney and University of California, Berkeley	
		Xunzi on Shadows	
		Kuan-yun HUANG , City University of Hong Kong	
		The Regulatory Relation between <i>qin qin</i> 親親 and <i>li</i> 禮 in Xunzi's Thought	
		Doil KIM , Sungkyunkwan University	
		Xunzi and the Classics	
		Lee-moi PHAM , Academia Sinica	
		<i>Huaxing</i> 化性 in the <i>Xunzi</i> : The Problem of Backsliding	
		Winnie SUNG , Nanyang Technological University	
18:30-20:30	Reception Party		Café Pensée 1F Academy Common

Time	Content	Venue
16:45-17:45	Session 4C	
	Moderator: Dobin CHOI , The University of Iowa	
	Knowing (<i>zhī</i> , 知) as ‘Connecting’ (<i>jiē</i> , 接): Discussions of Perceptual Knowledge in Early Chinese Philosophy	Room 1075 7F Liberty Tower
	Dennis SCHILLING , Renmin University of China	
The Mystery about the Beginning and Astonishment of Existence: comparing Kuki Shuzo and several Western Thoughts		
	OKINAGA Takashi , Teikyo University	
18:30-20:30	Reception Party	Café Pensée 1F Academy Common

December 15, 2019 (Day 2)

Time	Content	Venue
------	---------	-------

08:30-09:00	Registration	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
09:00-10:10	Keynote Speech II Speaker: Edward SLINGERLAND Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia “The Future of East Asian Philosophy: Engaging with Other Disciplines and the Digital Humanities” Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
10:10-10:25	Coffee break	Room 1081

Time	Content	Venue
10:25-11:55	Session 5A	
	Moderator: Foong-Ee PONG , Soochow University	
	The Supreme Self-Regarding Virtue: Mengzi's Flood-like Qi and Hume's Greatness of Mind"	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
	Dobin CHOI , The University of Iowa	
	Nishida's and Mou Zongsan's view of the Logical Genesis	
	ASAKURA Tomomi , Kobe City University of Foreign Studies	
11:55-13:20	Chinese philosophy in France: From its beginnings to recent debates	
	ZHANG Yijing , Sun Yat-sen University	
11:55-13:20	Lunch	

Time	Content	Venue
10:25-11:55	Session 5B	
	Moderator: Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN , Kyoto University	
	Nishida on "time": remarks from Wittgenstein	Room 1074 7F Liberty Tower
	Florencia Andrea DI ROCCO VALDECANTOS , Keio University	
	The Self as Another Person: Some readings and questions in the genre of "personal account" (zizhuan 自傳) in the Chinese Tradition	
	Stéphane Feuillas (飛颺) , University Paris-Diderot	
11:55-13:20	Decentering the State and Envisioning Democratic Socialism: Zhang Dongsun's Philosophy of Socialism in 1920's China	
	Soonyi LEE , Mercy College	
11:55-13:20	Lunch	

Time	Content		Venue
10:25-11:55	Oneness, Linging, and Constancy: Three Approaches to Daoist Cultivation	Session 5C: Organized Panel	
		Moderator: Thomas MICHAEL , Beijing Normal University	
		Cultivating the One in <i>Fanwu liuxing</i> and <i>Huangdi Sijing</i>	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
		Sharon SMALL , East China Normal University	
		The Lingering Dao in the Excavated Versions of the <i>Laozi</i>	
		Thomas MICHAEL , Beijing Normal University	
		Constancy as Balance in a Dynamic Universe	
		Livia KOHN , Boston University	
11:55-13:20	Lunch		

Time	Content		Venue
10:25-11:55	Proposing New Perspectives on “Intercorporality” from East-Asian Philosophical Viewpoint	Session 5D: Organized Panel	
		Moderator KONO Tetsuya , Rikkyo University	
		The Concept of Ma and Maai in Zeami and Munenori Yagyu	Room 1085 8F Liberty Tower
		KONO Tetsuya , Rikkyo University	
		The Embodiment of the “Mind” in Neo-Confucianism	
		ITO Takayuki , International Research Center for Japanese Studies	
		Intercorporeality and <i>Aida</i> : An alternative view of social understanding	
		TANAKA Shogo , Tokai University	
		Individuality and Sociality of the Subject in Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji	
		INUTSUKA Yū , University of Tokyo	
11:55-13:20	Lunch		

Time	Content	Venue
13:20-14:30	Keynote Speech III Speaker: GODA Masato Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University “Toward an East Asian ‘Grammatology’” Moderator CHAN Kang Professor, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
14:30-14:45	Coffee break	Room 1081

Time	Content		Venue
14:45-16:15	Taiwanese Philosophy in the Japanese Colonial Period	Session 6A	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
		Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu , Meiji University	
		曾景來「善惡根源論」的佛教倫理學義蘊 嚴瑋泓 , 東海大學哲學系	
		Lin Maosheng's Philosophy of Education and its Background SHINO Yoshinobu , Meiji University	
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break		Room 1071

Time	Content	Venue
14:45-15:45	Session 6B	Room 1074 7F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Michael James HEMMINGSEN , University of Guam	
	A Different Kind of Authenticity: The Kyoto School's View of the Self and the Importance of Self-transformation	
	Lehel BALOGH , Hokkaido University Watsuji's Practical Philosophy as a Virtue Ethics	
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break	Room 1071

Time	Content	Venue
14:45-16:15	Session 6C	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
	Moderator: Ellie Hua WANG , National Chengchi University	
	Ritual and Confucian Shame	
	Ellie Hua WANG , National Chengchi University Moral Extension and Human Vocation in Fichte and Confucianism	
	Plato TSE , National Chengchi University 再探韓非道論	
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break	Room 1081

Time	Content		Venue
14:45-16:15	Japanese Thought (Miki, Watsuji, and Maruyama) as Encountered in the Philippines: On Translation, Nation, and Critique	Session 6D: Organized Panel	Room 1085 8F Liberty Tower
		Moderator: KAZASHI Nobuo , Dalian University of Technology	
		Miki Kiyoshi in the Philippines: Toward a Radical Transformation of “Concrete Philosophy” KAZASHI Nobuo , Dalian University of Technology	
		Watsuji’s Ethics from Filipino Eyes: Two Tensions in the Good Life Anton Luis SEVILLA , Kyushu University	
		Maruyama Masao in the Philippine Context: Moving Past World War II Karen Connie ABALOS-Orendain , University of the Philippines	
		Respondent: ODAGIRI Takushi , Kanazawa University	
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break		Room 1081

Time	Content	Venue
16:30-18:30	Session 7A	
	Moderator: Winnie SUNG , Nanyang Technological University	
	中国古代における「仁」概念の展開	Room 1073 7F Liberty Tower
	佐藤將之, 台湾大学哲学系	
	Family Rituals in Contemporary Korea and Philosophical Implications	
	WANG Hwa Yeong , Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy	
	Scaling the Wonder of <i>Satoyama</i>	
	Yi CHEN , Bond University	

Time	Content	Venue
16:30-18:30	Session 7B: Organized Panel	
	Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA , Ritsumeikan University	
	The Monk, the Swordsman and the Freediver—A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Performance	Room 1074 7F Liberty Tower
	Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA , Linfield College	
	‘Becoming the thing’: Nishida Kitarō on acting-intuition	
	Yuko ISHIHARA , Ritsumeikan University	
	Mindfulness and Flow: A phenomenological study	
	Erol COPELJ , Monash University	
	Skilled Interactions and Natural Movements in Japanese Puppetry	
	Haruka OKUI , Doshisha University	
	“Doing excellent” without knowing what to do: A Japanese Zen Buddhist critique of intellectualism	
	Katsunori MIYAHARA , University of Wollongong	

Time	Content		Venue
16:30-18:30	In the interstices of "religion" and "philosophy": The introduction and reception of Western categories and thoughts in imperial and modern China	Session 7C: Organized Panel	
		Moderator: Giulia FALATO , University of Oxford	
		Ethics as a strategy for cultural accommodation in Ruggieri's <i>Tianzhu shilu</i> 天主實錄 (True Record of the Lord of Heaven) Daniel CANARIS , Sun Yat-sen University	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower
		Integrating European moral philosophy to Chinese traditional practices: the cases of Li Jiugong 李九功's <i>Lixiu yijian</i> 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror for encouraging cultivation) and Han Lin 韓霖's <i>Duoshu</i> 鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell) Giulia FALATO , University of Oxford	
		Protestant Invention of Chinese Religion(s) in the Nineteenth Century Wei Leong TAY , University of Oxford	
		Immanuel Kant's influence on modern Chinese philosophy Timon GATTA , Sapienza University of Rome	

Time	Content	Venue
16:30-18:30	Session 7D	
	Moderator: Soonyi LEE, Mercy College	
	Beyond Reciprocity: The Golden Rule in Christianity and Mohism	Room 1085 8F Liberty Tower
	Joseph Emmanuel STA. MARIA, Ateneo De Manila University	
	Kyokutei Bakin and Romance of the Three Kingdoms	
DING Yiruo, Chinese University of Hong Kong		
	Zen kōan Analysis: Past, Present, and Future	
	Eiji SUHARA, Arizona State University	

Time	Content	Venue
18:35-18:50	Closing Ceremony ISEAP ahead: SHINO Yoshinobu Editor-in-Chief, The Journal of East Asian Philosophy and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University Closing remarks: GODA Masato Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University Moderator: ISHIHARA Yuko Management Committee Member of ISEAP and Assistant Professor, Ristumeikan University	Room 1083 8F Liberty Tower

Keynote speeches

December 14, 2019 (Day 1, 0900-1010, Room 1163, 16/F)

Moderator: KAKIUCHI Keiko (Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University)

Emptiness and Karmic Secularity

LIN Chen-Kuo

Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University

Abstract

Inspired by Charles Taylor's and Jürgen Habermas' recent reflections on the issue of secularity, this talk attempts to bring the Buddhist thinking into a dialogue and take an alternative path other than the transcendentalist philosophy of subjectivity. While the latter has been well elaborated in modern Neo-Confucianism and the Kyoto School, which can be characterized as taking an up-bound path to disclose the sacred realm, this talk rather propose a down-bound path to return to the secular. The up-bound path is guided by the metaphysical principle of transcendence *qua* immanence, which often brings the secular under the supervision/suppression of the transcendent and therefore fails to fairly recognize the plurality of the secular. By contrast, the down-bound path is taken to draw more attention to the secular as the open-ended life-world. With this idea in mind, this talk will examine the Buddhist notion of secularity and argue that a reverse form of classification of teachings (Ch. *panjiao*, Jp. *kyōhan*), which is different from the teleological dialectics as seen in the traditional methods of *panjiao/kyōhan*, will be more applicable for coping with the pressing situations in our age without sacrificing the insight of emptiness.

December 15, 2019 (Day 2, 0900-1010, Room 1083, 16/F)

Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu (Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University)

The Future of East Asian Philosophy: Engaging with Other Disciplines and the Digital Humanities

Edward SLINGERLAND

Professor, Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia

Abstract

It is commonly claimed that mind-body dualism is entirely foreign to China—or “the East” more generally. This talk will explore how engaging with the cognitive sciences and digital humanities undermines claims such as this, and more broadly can help us to do our work as scholars of comparative philosophy. Embracing an embodied view of human cognition gets us beyond strong social constructivism and its accompanying cultural essentialism. In addition, new tools from the science and digital humanities can, in combination with traditional archaeological and textual evidence, allow us to more accurately and rigorously assess claims about the philosophical and religious historical record. Specifically, I will focus on novel large-scale textual analysis techniques, online databases for sharing scholarly knowledge, and work in contemporary evolutionary anthropology and cognitive science relevant to the mind-body issue. I will conclude by considering how early Chinese views of mind-body relations do, in fact, differ from some modern Western conceptions, and how taking a more reasonable view of cultural differences can allow us to genuinely learn from other cultures.

December 15, 2019 (Day 2, 1320-1430, Room 1083, 16/F)

Moderator: CHAN Kang (Professor, Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University)

Toward an Archipelagic Rhythmo-Grammatology of “East-Asia”

GODA Masato

Dean and Professor, School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University

Abstract

Having decided to establish the International Society of East Asian Philosophy (ISEAP), a problem that we have to tackle sooner or later is the discourse, “East Asia Cooperative Community” (東亜協同体) and “Asian nationalism” addressed by Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) for instance, and Takeuchi Yoshimi respectively in the 1930s. These problematic notions are without doubt related to the War that ironically framed with the term, Pacific, as well as the identification of we ourselves or others as Japanese. Without knowing how “East Asia” has been constructed, it is absolutely difficult to set up an academic consortium like ISEAP. In doing so, I would like to further develop my thought on “archipelago”, “rhythm” and “gramma” by looking into the genealogy of “East Asia”. On top of that, I would also like to explore the possibility of having a new perspective toward “East Asia” in line with the works of Edouard Glissant (1928-2011) [archipelagic thinking], Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) [grammatology, rhythmology] and Kyuyo Ishikawa (1945-) [Kanji and Asia].

Individual Papers and Organized Panels

Dec. 14, 2019 (Day 1)

Section 1A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Daniel CANARIS, Sun Yat-sen University

Paper I

Different Understandings of Sentence within Yogācāra Buddhism

CHOI Seongho, University of Munich

Abstract

Keng (2018) published an article “How do we understand the meaning of a sentence Under the Yogācāra Model of the Mind? On Disputes Among East Asian Yogācāra Thinkers of the Seventh Century” in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. Investigating the commentaries of the Chinese Buddhist text *Cheng weishi lun* (成唯識論), he explained how each Chinese Yogācāra commentator had understood the process of understanding the meaning of a sentence.

I will explain that these various interpretations of the Chinese commentators were based on Xuanzang’s understanding of the Sanskrit word *pada*. This Sanskrit word means basically “an inflected word”, that is, a word with a nominal declension or a verbal conjugation. However, in some Sanskrit Buddhist texts such as the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and so on, *pada* is defined as sentence (*vākya*). I will suggest a possible explanation where this definition came from. Then I will show that this word is difficult to translate into other languages but was translated in possible ways in each region. For example, in Tibet this word was translated as *tshig* which means basically “a word”, but in China Xuanzang translated it as *jù* (句) which means basically “a phrase or sentence”. Finally, it will be shown that these different translations led different philosophical interpretations about the nature of sentence. I hope that my presentation will show how the difference of languages can lead different philosophical discussion in each region under the name of Buddhism.

Research Interests

Yogācāra Buddhism and philosophy of language

Paper II
Hakanashi, Mujo and beyond: On Karaki Junzo's Theory of Impermanence

CHEUNG Ching-yuen
Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstract

Karaki Junzo 唐木順三 (1904-1980) was a former professor at Meiji University. In his work *Mujo* 無常 (1964), Karaki discusses different notions of impermanence. In classical Japanese literature, such as *Mayfly Diary* 蜻蛉日記, *hakanashi* is the word to express the feeling of uncertainty. Later, this feeling is associated with Buddhist doctrine of *mujo*, which suggests all conditional things are impermanent. Karaki did not satisfy with this textbook definition of impermanence, and tried to examine a deeper meaning of *mujo* in Japanese poems written by Shinkei 心敬 (1406-1475), Sogi 宗祇 (1421-1502) and Basho 芭蕉 (1644-1694). Karaki further develops a metaphysics of impermanence through his interpretation on Japanese Buddhist philosophy, especially on Dogen 道元 (1200-1253). In this paper, I will try to discuss Karaki's theory of impermanence and its contemporary significance.

Research Interest

Japanese philosophy

Paper III
**Is Sino-Japanese Comparative political philosophy possible?
-- a case study on the idea of Revolution (革命)**

WANG Xiaolin
Department of Asian and International Studies, City University of Hong Kong

Abstract

One of the most unique points of Japanese Tennoism is the rejection of the idea of Revolution, Kakumei 革命, in contrast with China in particular. The Tenno family in Japan has long been the center of the Japanese political system; So far, studies have explored the reasons why Japan did not accept the idea of Revolution. However, the oldest Japanese historical documents of *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* also deserve scholarly attention in this regard: they not only provide more solid sources to support the hypotheses hitherto advanced by these studies, but can also suggest further possibilities regarding the background of the rejection of Revolution. While analyzing the influence of Chinese Wefts Texts on the two books and related documents, this paper will demonstrate a new perspective on understanding the historical background of this significant political as well as philosophical phenomenon.

Section 1B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Rika DUNLAP

Organized Panel:

Moral Psychology and Confucianism

Panel Abstract

Moral psychology is an emerging area of ethics, in which human action and thought are discussed and analyzed through an interdisciplinary engagement with the related fields of psychology and cognitive sciences. Many contemporary scholars of Confucianism welcome this trend, for their canonical texts, including the *Analects*, *Mengzi*, and *Xunzi* are not only compatible with but also helpful in understanding the empirical findings on moral cognition. This panel focuses on these various implications of Confucian moral psychology with the aim to contribute to the research on the ethical implications of our psychological make-up.

The first presentation by Rika Dunlap examines the ethical implications of Michael Puett's metaethical theory of the Confucian as-if world. Puett offers a revision of Confucian rituals and develops a metaethical theory that resembles Blackburn's projectivist theory of normativity. Dunlap focuses on the ethical implications of this revision and asks if this revision can be Confucian in spirit. The second presentation by George Tsai asks why early Confucian texts lack an elaborate theory on the debt of gratitude, given that the relationships are the foundation of moral practices in Confucianism. By highlighting this peculiar absence of debts of gratitude, Tsai offers an explanation for it. The third presentation by Jing Hu problematizes the idea of shame, which is characterized as a mark of a virtuous character in the *Mengzi*. Insofar as shame is often considered harmful, Hu focuses on the productive (and unproductive) ways in which shame can be used to reflect on the collective moral boundaries.

Paper I

The Confucian Philosophy of The As-if World: The Moral Narrative of Ancestors, Spirits, and *Tian* in the *Analects*

Rika DUNLAP
University of Guam

Abstract

In this presentation, I examine Michael Puett's theory of the as-if world by situating it in contemporary metaethical theories. Through an analysis of Blackburn's projectivism and McDowell's response to non-cognitivism, I argue that there are two different accounts of the as-if interpretations of the *Analects* 3.12: One is the projectivist account of the as-if world, in which one engages in a moral narrative of ancestors as if moral claims were truth-apt (but they are not), and the other is the agnostic account of the as-if world, in which one engages in a moral narrative as if these metaphysical claims of ancestors could be true without knowing how. I argue that Confucius in the *Analects* engages in the latter, and Puett in *To Become a God* agrees with my assessment that Confucius has the latter conception of the as-if world that spirits *could* exit. However, in his recent work on the philosophy of as-if, Puett seems to offer a projectivist interpretation by arguing that sensibilities are the source of normativity. Through an analysis of Blackburn's projectivism and McDowell's response to non-cognitivism, I argue that Puett's metaethical theory, if it is a version of projectivism, faces two main problems: the *junzi* attitude problem (and the phenomenological issue therein) and

the absolute conception problem, both of which, I assert, may be resolved with a cognitivist approach to the sensibility theory of metaethics.

Research Interests

Ethics, applied ethics, Japanese philosophy, and Confucianism

Paper II Gratitude Without Debts

George TSAI
University of Hawaii, Mānoa

Abstract

I explore the role and significance of *gratitude* in Classical Chinese ethical thought. In particular, I examine the implications of the fact that, although gratitude has an important place in the philosophical thought and writings of the Early Confucian ethical tradition (e.g., in the discussions of Confucius and Mencius of how one should relate to one's parents), the notion of *debt of gratitude* (or a *duty* or *obligation* of gratitude) is virtually absent in these discussions. This absence presents an interesting contrast with conceptions of gratitude in the Western ethical tradition. In the history of Western philosophy, we find versions of the notion of duty of gratitude in Seneca and Kant. More recently, contemporary analytic moral philosophers have also developed the idea.

Given, then, that (1) the Confucians place significant ethical importance on the notion and practice of gratitude, and (2) the Confucians think we have duties to certain others (e.g., to our parents), it's puzzling why (3) the Confucians did not think we have *duties of gratitude* to anyone (say, to our parents). In my paper, I offer an explanation.

Research Interests

Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Moral Psychology, and Chinese Philosophy

Paper III Shameless Bullies and Shameless Heroes: a Discussion of Shame's Communal Moral Value

Jing HU
Concordia University

Abstract

This article discusses shame's function in Mencian philosophy and modern society in general. Shame is known as a destructive emotion because it targets vulnerable objects (e.g. marginalized groups of people, minorities, members of LGBTQ community, disabled community and victims of sexual harassment). In Confucian philosophy, shame and shame related vocabularies such as *xiu* (羞), *chi* (恥), and *wu* (惡) are considered essential for morality. In Mencian philosophy, the heart of *xiu wu* (羞惡之心) is one of the four hearts that ground human inclinations towards moral growth. It is a curious phenomenon that shame is considered both instrumental and foundational to morality in Mencian philosophy, given the above-mentioned dilemma. I explore shame's function and discusses the seemingly

conflicting perspectives on shame in this paper. Through considering shame's function on both the individual who experiences shame and other members of the community, including those who witnesses, hears about, anticipates, situations that could bring about shame, I analyze shame's function in making members of the community reflect on their collective moral boundaries. In certain cases, shame is an economical and essential tool to make individuals conform to certain standards. Shame can also be devastating—some argues that it corrupts the person's sense of agency through self-doubting and denying, and through the paralyzing social pressure. I argue that we should be aware of this type of shame and seek methods to rescue individuals in situations alike.

Research Interests

Moral psychology, moral emotions, Confucianism, and Mencius (Mengzi)

Section 1C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA, Linfield College

Paper I

The Fullness of Nature: Overcoming Subjectivism in Watsuji's Theory of Fūdo

David JOHNSON

Department of Philosophy, Boston College

Abstract

In this talk I focus on an important problem in Watsuji's theory of fūdo. Self and nature form a unitary whole in fūdo, but they are so closely identified with one another in self understanding and disclosure that it is difficult to maintain them together in this unity without reducing one side to the other. In particular, too forceful an emphasis on the way in which cultural modes of disclosure always mediate what appears as nature threatens to reduce our experience of nature to our cultural forms of making sense of and displaying it.

The fact that it is we who disclose nature seems to entail a certain relativism and subjectivism about the content of this experience. I argue that these problems can be largely avoided by drawing on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty to show the ways in which self and nature are ontologically continuous with, and belong to, one another. Here, my subjectivity both "gives" me the natural world, and is always already something given in and continuous with it. Because we are part of and belong to the very nature we encounter and disclose, experiencing self and experienced nature must be seen as two aspects of the same phenomenon. In this regard it becomes possible to understand our culturally mediated experience and expression of nature as the self disclosure of nature, rather than as a process of subjective construal or projection.

Research Interests

Comparative philosophy, hermeneutics and phenomenology, and the Kyoto School

Paper II

内田周平と世界初の『中国哲学史』

曹峰 (CAO Feng)

中国人民大学哲学院

論文概要

今まで、史上初めての『中国哲学史』の作者である内田周平への評価があまり高くなかった。なぜなら、この十九世紀末に書かれた書物はそれほど「哲學」的ではないためである。だが、改めて内田氏の学問及び当時「哲學」の代表である井上哲次郎への批判を検討してみると、今日内田氏を再評価する必要があると思われる。まず、内田氏の宋代理学研究に真知があり、また、井上哲次郎への批判に合理性がある。したがって内田氏の漢学立場を堅守することに対して、簡単に保守的な行為と認定するのはよくない。内田氏の生涯を通して、私たちが十九世紀末期から二十世紀初期まで日本の中国哲学研究の特別な発展経過を見ることができる。

研究分野

中国古代思想史、中国出土資料、日本の漢学

Section 2A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1315-1445)

Moderator: Yi CHEN, Bond University

Paper I

Movements without thinking in the moment: the implications of skilled performance in the *Zhuangzi*

Foong-Ee PONG

Department of Philosophy, Soochow University

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to explore the implications of skilled performance in the *Zhuangzi*. What can we learn from the effortless and highly effective movements performed by the craft masters? How can we attain a particular body like the craft masters? I argue that the body of craft masters operates as a “plural self,” as opposed to the “monadic self,” that manifest what I called embodied dominance of human actions. Embodied dominance enables a person to act through mutual cooperation with others not in the social world alone but also in the whole embodied system in the world. It is the opposite of heart-mind dominance (namely *chengxin* 成心 in the *Zhuangzi*.) Through disregard one’s heart-mind dominance, one resorts to the body which has its root in the interactive embodied system. In other words, when operating on the basis of a plural self, one is able to exploit environmental resources thereby chance of achievement is increased. The stories of craft master imply the ideal way of living that is to get ourselves involved in order to create order through mutual cooperation: the order of life is flowing within our relationships with others awaits to be rhythmised.

Research Interest

Daoism

Paper II

Nishida Kitarō as a classical Confucian moral philosopher: Reconfiguring “the actualization of personality”

LAM Wing-keung

Faculty of International Liberal Arts, Dokkyo University

kevin@dokkyo.ac.jp

Abstract

This paper attempts to propose that Nishida Kitarō 西田幾多郎 (1870-1945) is a classical Confucian moral philosopher, with a focus on the notion, “the actualization of personality 人格實現說”. Nishida employed a number of Confucian ideas like sincerity 誠, the union of knowledge, feeling and volition 知情意の統一, to criticize a number of “Western” moral theories, including, but not limited to, utilitarianism 快樂說 and authority theory 權力說. Moreover, this paper is not intended to demonstrate Nishida’s moral philosophy as a Confucian-Western interchange, but rather to argue that Nishida is indeed a classical Confucian moral philosopher, who shed new lights on classical Confucian moral discourse. In the following lines, our discussions include, first, why and how Nishida is connected with classical Confucian moral philosophy? Second, in what way does Nishida reconfigure and

contribute to classical Confucian moral philosophy? Third, what lessons Nishida can offer to classical Confucian moral philosophy or moral philosophy itself?

Research Interests

Japanese philosophy, Chinese philosophy and transcultural philosophy

Paper III

《論語》仁論的年代歸屬

李貴生 (LEE Kwai Sang)

香港教育大學文學及文化學系

(Department of Literature and Cultural Studies, The Education University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

今本《論語》的來歷和定型問題一直引起熱烈的討論，催生出各式各樣的「層累說」(accretion theory)。隨著近年中國早期文本研究的深化，學界普遍意識到漢人在古書形成過程中所扮演的重要角色，個別學者甚至因而聲稱《論語》是漢代的產物，建議把它置入漢代的語境中。把《論語》視為西漢時期的典籍，其代價是否定了思想史上公認的先秦兩漢儒學系譜。針對這種意見，本文擬以《論語》「仁」論為軸心，考察此一觀念與西漢學術的差異，試圖通過仁論的異質性，逆向地反證它應屬前漢時代的產物，為《論語》年代歸屬的討論及上古儒學史的書寫提供可行的解決方案。

Research Interests

中國學術研究範式、《論語》研究、傳統學術文化

(Paradigm Shift of Chinese Scholarship, Studies of the *Analects*, Traditional Chinese Culture)

Section 2B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1315-1445)

Moderator: Myeong-seok KIM, Yonsei University

Organized Panel:

Reason, Emotion and Moral Agency in Ancient China

Panel Abstract

In this panel, we deal with a set of important philosophical issues in ancient Chinese moral philosophy and moral psychology. The presenters talk about Mozi, Mengzi, and Xunzi respectively, and each discusses one of the following topics: (1) the relationship between reason or reasoning and moral motivation in Mozi, (2) the problem of self-deception and happy case of *akrasia* in Mengzi, and (3) the question of how to cultivate truly moral agents in Xunzi. Each presenter tries to provide a thorough and critical review of the important previous scholarship on their topics and suggest alternative solutions to or alternative ways of thinking about these issues.

Paper I

Reason and Moral Motivation in Mozi

Myeong-seok KIM

Department of Philosophy, Yonsei University

Abstract

In this presentation, I critically review Chris Fraser's claim that the ancient Chinese thinkers had a very different conception of logic or argumentation and agency from that in the West. Specifically, he argues that the ancient Chinese thinkers formulated their conception of logic and agency mainly around the concept of *bian* (辯, discrimination), and this involves further claims such as that (1) the ancient Chinese thinkers had no concept of sentence or proposition, (2) they did not engage in logical argumentation in its proper sense, and (3) reason or rationality was not highly valued in ancient China for normative evaluation of actions because they viewed action primarily as a skillful activity of applying models or rules to their everyday situations based on the proper performance of *bian* rather than as a result of a practical argument or deliberation. However, I show that most of these claims are largely mistaken or overstated, and textually ill-supported. I alternatively argue that (1) the early Chinese thinkers were quite competent in articulating their ideas in clear forms of propositions *and* sentences, (2) Mozi's reasoning process consists of premises and a conclusion arranged in such a way that the truth of the premises is transferred to the conclusion in a legitimate logical sense, and that (3) Mozi provides various forms of arguments that are partly intended to give his audience opportunities to evaluate competing options available to them rationally and choose for themselves the most reasonable or correct type of action in particular situations. And I also argue that moral judgment in Mozi has an "internal" or conceptual connection with moral action.

Research Interests

Ancient Chinese philosophy, ethics, moral psychology, theories of emotion

Paper II
**Self-Deception in Mengzi 5A2:
On the Permissible Case of Incontinence and the “Happy Case of Action Failure”**

Joonho LEE
University of Utah

Abstract

This essay aims to clarify the problems of incontinent moral agents, specifically Shun 舜 who offered hospitality to his brother Xiang 象 while knowing Xiang’s murderous intention toward himself in *Mengzi* 5A2. Regarding Shun, Mengzi 孟子 states that “a nobleman can be deceived by what fits with rightness (*junzi ke qi yi qifang* 君子可欺以其方).” Previous scholars, such as Jeong-Keun Shin, seem to interpret that Shun was never deceived, in that he is a perfect moral agent. However, interpretations of this kind cannot provide a consistent understanding of the passage as they ignore the notion of the “deceived nobleman” in Mengzi’s statement. To account for both the story of Shun and Mengzi’s statement, we have to acknowledge that Shun *was deceived* while *knowing* about Xiang’s intention. This poses two problems. First, Shun’s state of “being deceived while knowing the relevant facts” seems paradoxical. Second, the notion that a perfect moral agent—i.e. Shun—can be deceived is problematic. Regarding the former, I propose that Shun’s “being deceived while knowing” can be understood as a self-deceiving state caused by his incontinent love for his brother. As for the latter, I argue that Mengzi regards Shun’s case as permissible since his incontinence—the major cause of his self-deception—befits his morally crucial beliefs, and that this makes him a perfect moral agent. This story seems to reflect Mengzi’s *sui generis* way of describing perfect moral agents—namely, introducing cases where perfect moral agents act incontinently or deceive themselves—to show how their moral inclinations or desires work.

Research interests

Ancient Chinese philosophy, problem of akrasia, metaethics, virtue ethics

Paper III
**How Can *Li* (禮) Transform an Agent into a ‘Truly’ Moral Person in Xunzi?:
Inducing Respect (敬) by Performing *Li* in the Flesh**

Jihyun HWANG
Department of Philosophy, Yonsei University

Abstract

The aim of this study is to delineate the function of *li* in Xunzi. It is widely accepted that *li* plays a crucial role in Xunzi. Specifically, I intend to suggest a new interpretation of Xunzi’s view on how *li* can transform an agent into a ‘truly’ moral person who attains proper inner states. David Wong has made a good point that *li* in Xunzi can transform an agent by working on her natural feelings such as grief and remembrance. He argues that Xunzi’s point is that *li* is highly effective in shaping and channeling natural feelings that have no original moral contents, while Mengzi holds that such natural feelings are directed toward the moral. I accept Wong’s idea that *li*’s mechanism of moral transformation is deeply related to emotion. However, I disagree with his contention that Mengzi and Xunzi have different opinions about natural feelings such

as grief, considering that Mengzi and Xunzi show no discrepancy concerning grief and mourning rituals. The possibility that I want to explore in this study is that the key to moral transformation by *li* is to develop *respect* (敬). I will argue that respect is best regarded as a kind of artificial emotion in *Xunzi* in that it is hard to be attained without additional measures, namely, performing *li* in the flesh. Furthermore, I will show that my interpretation can help to understand the *Xunzi* as a more consistent and plausible text.

Research Interests

Ancient Chinese philosophy, moral psychology, experimental philosophy, metaethics

Section 2C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1315-1445)

Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University

Paper I

The Kyoto School and the Problem of Philosophical Modernism

Hans Peter LIEDERBACH

School of Sociology, Kwansei Gakuin University

Abstract

An influential strand in current research on Japanese philosophy rests on the assumption that Western philosophy has reached an impasse, accompanied by a sense of exhaustion, which it can overcome only by a radical transformation, that is by opening up to insights generated by the tradition of Japanese thought, especially by the Kyoto school commencing with Nishida Kitarô. While I deeply sympathize with the purpose behind this assumption, that is the project of fostering cross-cultural philosophical dialogue, I disagree with its theoretical presuppositions, namely Heidegger's and Nishitani's critique of philosophical modernism. To corroborate my disagreement, I provide a critical examination of Heidegger's concept of "History of Being" and its appropriation by Nishitani and his disciples, before I offer an alternative view on the possible significance of Kyoto school philosophy for the project of cross-cultural dialogue in the context of philosophical modernism. Therefore, I argue, the very concept of modernism has to be transformed. For this purpose, I suggest that we take into account the notion of "multiple modernities," which has come to the fore in the wake of the new millennium. Although this notion was developed by social scientists, it has significant bearings on the concept of philosophical modernism, which, in turn, will make it necessary for us to alter our view on how Kyoto school philosophers tried to make sense of the modern project.

Research Interests

Kyoto School philosophy, continental philosophy, philosophical modernism

Paper II

Reconsidering the "Human" from the Perspective of Confucianism: Interpretive Resemblance between Dai Zhen, Jiao Xun, and Roger T. Ames

TATEBE Ryohei

Department of Area Studies, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, University of Tokyo

Abstract

How do we think about the "human"? The purpose of this paper is to discuss and reconsider the meaning of "human" from the perspective of Chinese philosophy, especially from Confucianism. For the first step, I focused on the view of Roger, T Ames who has made significant contributions to the study of Chinese and comparative philosophy. In his opinion, when we think the "human", it's wrong to make the question in ancient greece style like "what is a human 'being'?" He claimed that it's more properly to make the question in Confucianism style like "in what way does a person 'become' consummately human?". It means that he denied to understand the "human" in essentialist way.

After analysing the view of Roger, T Ames, in this paper, I summoned famous Qing scholars Dai Zhen (1724-1777) and Jiao Xun (1763-1820) as interlocutors. Both scholars criticized the

Neo-Confucianism, and they were highly evaluated as *Mencius* interpreters. For them, the essentialist image of “human” which were understood through the terms such as “理 *li*” and “性 *xing*” in Neo-Confucianism is an object of criticism, and developed the claim that all “human” is worthwhile to changing, in the so-called “性善 *xingshan*” argument. Here I recognized the interpretive resemblance between Roger, T Ames, Dai Zhen and Jiao Xun. Therefore, this paper reconsiders the “human” through considering these scholars’ commonalities and their differences.

Research Interests

Chinese philosophy and Confucianism in Qing dynasty

Paper III

The Role of the Supernatural in Japanese Confucianism

NG Wai Ming

Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstract

According to the *Lun Yu* (Analects), “the topics the Master did not speak of were prodigies, force, disorder and gods.” Many people believe that Confucianism is a humanistic or this-worldly philosophy that cares less about the supernatural. This is indeed a misconception. The harmony between heaven and human is the ultimate principle in Confucianism and human ethics can never be separated from the spirits. The supernatural is an important force behind the establishment of human relationships. Confucian scholars in China and Japan had a big appetite for supernatural issues. They wrote about them extensively to expound Confucian ideas. This study examines the role of the supernatural in the making of Confucianism in Japan from textual and comparative perspectives.

Research Interests

Tokugawa intellectual history and Japan-China cultural relations

Section 3A (Room 1163, 16/F, 1500-1630)

Moderator: Yosuke TAKEHANA, Otani University

Paper I

Shun's 舜 Ascension to the Throne: Various Interpretations

Youngsun BACK

College of Confucian Studies and Eastern Philosophy, Sungkyunkwan University

Abstract

This paper examines the story of Shun's 舜 ascension to the throne. This story has drawn considerable attention throughout Chinese history because of its significance with regard to political succession. However, in this paper, I shed lights on a different dimension of the story: its relevance to the issue of contingency. I investigate four texts, two excavated and two transmitted: "Failure and Success Depend on Times" (*Qionгда yi shi* 窮達以時), "The Way of Yao and Shun" (*Tang Yu zhi dao* 唐虞之道), the *Mencius*, and the *Xunzi*, examining how notions such as Heaven (*tian* 天), timing (*shi* 時), and fate (*ming* 命) are employed in these texts. I uses these texts to showcase different ways of thinking about areas over which they believe humans lack control, and examine why they offer different interpretations of the same event of Shun's ascension and the kinds of moral and political lessons they try to draw from this. The analysis and comparison of these texts will provide us a direction for research on the issue of contingency.

Paper II

Mozi's Pantheism and Berkeley Theism: Dissolving (Or Not) the Tension between Consequentialism and Divine Command Theory

Michael James HEMMINGSEN

Division of Humanities, University of Guam

Abstract

Mozi and George Berkeley are philosophers that are not often put into contrast. However, there are certain similarities between Mozi and Berkeley's metaphysical views that give rise to an apparent tension between consequentialism and divine command theory in both of their philosophical systems. Specifically, this tension is a result of the absence of an appearance-reality distinction in their systems, and a lack of interest in establishing any kind of "essence" of morality, with the result that both Mozi and Berkeley believe that we can take moral guidance (though only guidance) from the natural world. Since their concern is therefore with nature as a measuring stick for morality, the issue of whether morality is ultimately grounded in divine will or in benefit becomes a secondary consideration. Hence, they do not clearly identify whether their moral philosophies should be fundamentally taken as divine command theories or as a kind of consequentialism, and this gives rise to the tension between these two positions in their philosophical systems. In this paper, I argue that though both Mozi and Berkeley appear to have this tension – and that they appear to have this tension for similar reasons – in fact Mozi's pantheistic understanding of nature provides Mohists with resources for dissolving the tension that are not available to Berkeley's theism. Hence, the tension between divine command theory and utilitarianism is merely apparent in Mozi, but a genuine problem for Berkeley.

Research Interests

Social and political philosophy and ethics, with a particular focus on deliberative democracy, critical theory and comparative philosophy.

Paper III**Absolute nothingness and self-identity**

Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN

Philosophy Department, Kyoto University

Abstract

It is uncontentious that Nishida Kitarô's thought developed into a mature and self-contained philosophy upon the publication of *Basho* (1926), where he developed the concept of "absolute nothingness" (絶対無). There is, however, very little consensus regarding the logical and metaphysical details of "absolute nothingness." As it stands, we find even less agreement about how the concept relates to Nishida's later philosophy.

The aim of this paper is twofold. In the first part, I will clarify Nishida's metaphysical assumptions regarding the nature of true reality and thence reconstruct the necessary logical steps involved in his conception of "absolute nothingness" as the *indeterminate* ground of all being. In the second part, I will argue that the radicality of Nishida's metaphysics lies in his rejection of the law of identity, which posits self-identity as a criterion of existence. That is, I will claim that Nishida had to negate the self-identity of absolute nothingness in order to explain how the indeterminate ground can determine the being of all entities.

Research Interests

Meiji-period philosophy, Kyôto School, Nishida Kitarô, British Idealism, Pragmatism, Metaphysics

Section 3B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1500-1630)

Moderator: Rafal K STEPIEN, Heidelberg University

Organized Panel:

Ontology, Epistemology, Language: East Asian Madhyamaka Perspectives

Panel Abstract

This panel seeks to advance the study of East Asian Buddhist philosophy, and particularly that of the Chinese Madhyamaka/Sanlun (三論) school. Deliberately wide-ranging in scope both topically and temporally, the panel addresses several important developments of Buddhist ontology, epistemology, and philosophy of language in China. As a whole, it seeks to augment the slew of recent research in Buddhist philosophy through study of specifically East Asian developments, be these couched within originally Indic texts, Chinese innovations, or Tibetan commentarial disputes.

The panel begins with a study of the metaphysical positions espoused in the *Twelve Gates Treatise* (*Dvādaśamukhaśāstra*/十二門論) traditionally attributed to the Madhyamaka founder Nāgārjuna (龍樹) and extant only in the Classical Chinese of Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什). This paper provides a critical exposition of the ideas and arguments deployed in a work of major importance for the history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. The second paper develops on this account by studying how the premier Chinese Sanlun exponents Sengzhao (僧肇) and Jizang (吉藏) link metaphysics to philosophy of language by embedding their systematic, Madhyamaka-based conception of the provisionality of language within an ontological conception of indeterminacy termed ontic indeterminacy. The final paper then relates defenses of Gelukpa Madhyamaka anti-foundationalist metaphysics by Purbuchok Ngawang Jampa and the 8th Karmapa Mikyö Dorjé to epistemological concerns, in terms of the use of both epistemic instruments (*pramāṇa*) and meditative experience in grounding claims to knowledge.

Paper I

Nāgārjuna and the *Twelve Gates Treatise* (十二門論): Towards a Chinese Madhyamaka Philosophy

Rafal K STEPIEN

Heidelberg Centre for Transcultural Studies

Heidelberg University

Abstract

The *Twelve Gates Treatise* (*Dvādaśamukhaśāstra*/十二門論) is traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna (龍樹 c. 150-250), founder of the Madhyamaka school basic to all Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. Together with the *Middle Treatise* (*Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā*/中論) also of Nāgārjuna and the *Hundred Verse Treatise* (*Śatakaśāstra*/百論) of Āryadeva (提婆 3rd century), it is one of the three core texts of the Sanlun (i.e. Three Treatise: 三論) school, the Chinese development of Indian Madhyamaka, and consequently exerted a pivotal yet understudied influence on the entire subsequent history of Chinese Buddhist philosophy. The text examines concepts fundamental to Buddhist philosophy such as causation, conditionality, existence, identity, impermanence, and origination – all as seen through the lens of universal

emptiness. Although no longer extant in the original Sanskrit, the work remains available in the Classical Chinese translation of Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什 344-413).

This paper has two aims. Firstly, it is concerned to expound the metaphysical positions espoused within the text and assess the coherence and cogency of certain arguments presented in support of them therein. Secondly, it aims to situate the *Twelve Gates Treatise* within the broader currents of Madhyamaka philosophy by critically evaluating its attribution to Nāgārjuna based on the philosophical relationship between this treatise and other texts undisputedly authored by him. The paper thus provides both a critical exposition of a major work of Chinese Buddhist philosophy and a preliminary analysis of its place in Indo-Chinese Buddhist intellectual history.

Paper II
**Indeterminacy and the Provisionality of Language:
A Chinese Madhyamaka Perspective**

Chien-hsing HO
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy
Academia Sinica, Taiwan

Abstract

Sengzhao (374?–414 CE) and Jizang (549–623 CE), two leading Chinese Madhyamaka thinkers of Sanlun Buddhism, propound the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness but tend to understand the concept of emptiness to mean the absence of determinate nature and form. Using Chinese Madhyamaka thought as a basis, I have reconstructed an ontological conception of indeterminacy, termed ontic indeterminacy (OI), which involves the thesis that all things are indeterminate with respect to the ways they are.

Significantly, OI makes sense only given a particular understanding and use of language. Basically, for the Chinese Mādhyamikas, language is provisional in the sense that the use of an expression to refer to a given thing does not predicate of that thing any determinate feature in such a way as to make it conclusively determinable.

In this paper, I discuss Sengzhao's and Jizang's views on the provisionality of language to present a systematic, Madhyamaka-based conception of language. For this purpose, I also examine their use of nonimplicative negation in contrast to implicative negation and seek to analyze Jizang's use of the *catuskoṭi* (positive and negative tetralemmas) in relation to classical logic.

Paper III
**Being a Mādhyamika Means More Than Just Arguing with Opponents:
Purbuchok and Mikyö Dorje on Experience and Epistemic Instruments**

John C. POWERS
Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation
Deakin University, Australia

Abstract

My presentation will focus on the responses of Purbuchok Ngawang Jampa (Phur bu lcog Ngag dbang byams pa, 1682–1762) and the 8th Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje (Mi bskyod rdo rje, 1507–1554), to Daktsang's (sTag tshang Lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, 1405–1477) presentation of Madhyamaka. These are two of the most significant philosophical responses to Daktsang's arguments. Both emphasize the centrality of meditative experience for proper application of Madhyamaka methodology, but they have radically divergent perspectives.

Purbuchok develops a system of Madhyamaka that can incorporate the use of epistemic instruments (*tshad ma*; Skt. *pramāṇa*) without succumbing to the errors of foundationalism that Daktsang sees in the Gelukpa approach. Purbuchok presents a nuanced (but still problematic) interpretation that provides a coherentist reading of Tsongkhapa: it is possible to take an “anthropological” approach to epistemic instruments and the judgements they warrant, simply describing how valid deployment of *pramāṇas* leads to successful activity and reproducible results. While this may rescue Gelukpa Madhyamaka from some of the most significant implications of Daktsang's rebuttal, it also leads to the problem of relativism encountered by contemporary coherentist epistemologies. Mikyö Dorje presents a radical interpretation of Candrakīrti, according to which a Mādhyamika, qua Mādhyamika, takes no position whatsoever and only refutes opponents with *reductio* arguments. My presentation will discuss the philosophical implications of their philosophical moves and the extent to which they are successful.

Section 3C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1500-1630)

Moderator: Sharon SMALL, East China Normal University

Paper I

Mediating the Self, Experiencing the Dream in the *Zhuangzi* and *Inception*

Chloe Yuchen YAN

Regional Studies East Asia Program, Harvard -Yenching Fellow, Harvard University

Abstract

This article explores the experiential conceptions of the self in the 4th century BCE Chinese text of Zhuangzi's butterfly dream and a 2010 science fiction film *Inception* by Christopher Nolan. Central to both texts is the metaphysical understanding of the self within the multi-layered dream-reality space. Yet often ignored is the very media form of such conceptual structure, its own precondition. By engaging with media philosophies as a new theoretical grounding and a concrete methodology for this study of comparative thought, this article situates the metaphysical understanding of dream and reality in the human sensory and conceptual experience, beyond the philosophical content.

From Zhuangzi's metaphorical language in print media to Nolan's audiovisual cinematograph, the philosophical concepts of abstract ideas such as "the self" and "the other", dream and reality, are embodied differently. More important is the simultaneous realization and loss of "the self" from the spectator's perspective through the sensory simulation of filmic media. Taking this contemporary notion of spectatorship, we can thus return to Zhuangzi's metaphorical language as a medium that mediates and extends the reader's cognitive comprehension and reasoning into the abstract concepts within the text. The discussion of the self and the other is therefore no longer refined to the realm of the narrator of the dream, the dreamer, and the butterfly. But the dynamic between the text and human cognition entails another experiential notion of the self in a reality mediated by the very medium of Zhuangzi's philosophy.

Research Interests

Media philosophy and theory, film aesthetics, and history of urban space, with a focus on East Asian contexts

Paper II

A Study on the Images of Guan Yu (關羽) and Gan Ji (于吉) in ehon tsūzoku sangokushi (繪本通俗三国志)

William Wai Kim LEE

Department of Japanese Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong

Abstract

This study is to investigate the shintoization of *The Romance of Three Kingdoms* (三国演义) by reviewing of images of two characters, Guan Yu and Gan Ji in ehon tsūzoku sangokushi. (繪本通俗三国志) It is an illustration book published in 1840, that visualized the three kingdoms story based on Tsuzoku Sangokushi (通俗三国志), the first translation of *The Romance of Three Kingdoms* in Edo period. Guan Yu is customarily portrayed as a general, while Gan Ji is a taoist priest. Despite their different images in the three kingdoms' story, they

have been depicted with the image of Japanese-style ghost, known as Yurei (幽霊). In Ukiyo-e (浮世絵) and Kusazōshi (草双紙), illustrated literature of Edo period, ghosts are often characteristic by disheveled hair, white or pale blue robe, limp hands, nearly transparent, and lack of lower body. By contrasting the ghost images of Guan Yu and Gan Ji with those illustrations found in Kusazōshi, this study explains how the depiction of ghost images of Guan Yu and Gan Ji transforms *The Romance of Three Kingdoms* into a localized revenge story during Edo period.

Research Interests

The Shintoization of the romance of Three Kingdoms in Edo Period, illustrations in vernacular literatures of Edo period, Yokai and Yurei in Ukiyo-e printings

Paper III

Flowing Body, Ubiquitous Mind: Toward an Aesthetics of *Qi*

MITSUMATSU Yukio

School of Information and Communication/Arts and Letters, Meiji University

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to explore the ontological foundation of *qi* (氣) theory and its potentialities toward aesthetics in broader sense, through comparative studies with recent philosophical panpsychism, and with animist ontology newly reinvestigated in contemporary anthropology.

In order to set about this inquiry, I will take up the corpus of philosopher/sinologist and composer ISHIDA Hidemi (1950-2017), whose historico-theoretical research had focused on the realm around *qi* concept as East Asian medical thought.

Besides working as an academic, Ishida had written substantial *œuvre* of music, in which we can discern *mise-en-abîme* relations between composition and “logical” operation whose system probably being derived, along with the hypotheses formulated by science historian YAMADA Keiji (1932-), from the structure found in *yunqi* theory (運氣論) and its archetypal *gua* (卦) system in *Yijing* (『易經』); the music has been executed and annotated, for example, by his quasi-collaborating pianist/composer TAKAHASHI Yuji (1938-).

While these trans-disciplinary practices have proceeded in an experimental manner, recent ontological animism in anthropology seems to suggest the way to reinscribe the mode of *qi* as *breathing* of the Earth that flows throughout human and more-than-human bodies, while posthuman panpsychism would articulate the nature of this vital force as non-organic *becoming*, or *wuhua* (物化) by using Zhuangzi’s term, i.e. self-other transformations with their necessary *distinction* (*fen*, 分), like music where the zone of indiscernibility between human and nonhuman sound will appear.

Research Interests

Philosophy (Comparative Philosophy, Ontology, Vitalism, Deconstruction), Art and Literature (Aesthetics, Poetics, Contemporary Arts)

Section 4B (Room 1073, 7/F, 1645-1815)

Moderator: Jeffrey RIEGEL, University of Sydney and University of California, Berkeley

Organized Panel: New Perspectives on Xunzi

Panel Abstract

As someone who lived close to the end of the Warring States period, Xunzi was one of the leading intellectual figures of the day, someone who was knowledgeable about history, the ritual institutions, the classics, and all the major intellectual currents of his time. This panel proposes a close re-examination of his intellectual thought from a variety of novel and refreshing perspectives. In the papers by Kuan-yun HUANG (City University of Hong Kong) and Lee-moi PHAM (Academia Sinica), passages from Xunzi will be reread in the light of newly unearthed manuscripts from the Warring States. In the papers by Doil KIM (Sungkyunkwan University) and Winnie SUNG (Nanyang Technological University), aspects of Xunzi's philosophy will be subject to fresh critical analysis. Such collective effort, it is hoped, will result in the much-needed reevaluation of Xunzi, his place in Early Chinese thought, and his legacy. The panel will be chaired by Jeffrey Riegel (University of California, Berkeley), translator of the *Lüshi chunqiu* and *Mozi*, and author of an extensive review on a recent translation of the *Xunzi*.

Paper I Xunzi on Shadows

Kuan-yun HUANG
City University of Hong Kong

Abstract

One of Xunzi's most intriguing passages is a fable about a man haunted by his own shadow, recorded in the chapter "Jie bi" 解蔽 (Dispelling blindness). Who is this man? Why does Xunzi disapprove of him? What are the issues at stake? Reading Xunzi side by side with a newly unearthed manuscript, the "Fan wu liu xing" 凡物流形 (All things flow into form) now at the Shanghai Museum, I will show that Xunzi's fable is a direct criticism against a view prevalent during the Warring States: the mind has multiple constituents, and its unity is achieved only through the isolation of an innermost core that is free from external distractions.

Paper II The Regulatory Relation between *qin qin* 親親 and *li* 禮 in Xunzi's Thought

Doil KIM
Sungkyunkwan University

Abstract

This paper explores the issue of how *qin qin* 親親, namely particularistic affection, is to be regulated in Xunzi's thought in comparison with Mengzi's 孟子 thought. As is well known, Mengzi emphasizes the importance of moral extension (*kuochong* 擴充), namely the

application of universal love, such as *ce yin zhi xin* 惻隱之心, to a broader range of people to the extent that one can love and protect all within the four seas (*sihai* 四海). Simultaneously, however, Mengzi advocates particularist affection for those who stand in special relationships, such as one's own family. Moreover, if universal love and particularist affection conflict with each other, Mengzi seems to assign priority to the latter. However, unless one should somehow regulate one's particularist affection to a certain degree, one would be unable to extend universal love to many more people properly, far from loving all within the four seas. Unfortunately, Mengzi does not treat this issue seriously.

On the other hand, Xunzi thinks that one's particularist affection should be regulated basically by *li* 禮, the Confucian formal rules of conduct. Xunzi draws the distinction between humans and other animals by pointing to a particular capacity for discrimination (*bian* 辨) that pertains only to humans. For him, only humans can have a more developed capacity to discriminate among more subtle distinctions, so that they can have more sophisticated modes of responsiveness, such as special love for one's own father (*fuzi zhi qin* 父子之親). In addition, Xunzi makes it clear that the capacity for discrimination should be regulated by *li* in the sense that *li* functions as the standards for various kinds of distinction that cover all human relations. For this reason, from the viewpoint of Xunzi, it is reasonable to say that particularistic affection should basically be regulated by *li*. This paper explores what exactly this regulatory relation between *qin qin* and *li* implies in Xunzi's thought.

Paper III **Xunzi and the Classics**

Lee-moi PHAM
Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy, Academia Sinica

Abstract

The background for this paper is the assumptions, concerns, rhetorical strategies, even conclusions shared by Warring States authors in their discussions about the classics. It begins with a survey of several ancient accounts that attempt to situate the classics in a historical narrative, including the newly excavated text "Xing zi ming chu" 性自命出 (Human nature arises from mandate). By a careful analysis of passages from Xunzi, the study will show that this erudite thinker from the late Warring States made an effort to synthesize the various positions on the classics, offering what is in the end a comprehensive program for their study.

Paper IV **Huaxing 化性 in the Xunzi: The Problem of Backsliding**

Winnie SUNG
Nanyang Technological University

Abstract

This paper examines what it means for one's nature to be transformed (*huaxing* 化性) for Xunzi. In the literature, there are plenty of discussions of Xunzi's thought that our problematic human nature (*xing* 性) can be transformed and also of the question how such transformation is possible. A question that is less often raised is whether it is possible for one

to backslide to her original problematic state even if one's nature has been transformed. How we answer this question turns on the nature of transformation that Xunzi has in mind. Is it like a caterpillar transforming to a butterfly, or a piece of stone into jade, or a lump of clay into a statue, or a derelict grassland into an orderly mown lawn? In the first section, I will examine textual evidence and argue that backsliding is possible for Xunzi. That said, it is unclear in what way one might backslide. In the second and third sections, I consider three possible ways in which one can backslide and the implications they each have over our understanding of Xunzi. In the fourth section, I will argue for one reading that takes transformation to be akin to derelict grassland transforming to mown lawn. This reading can make better sense of Xunzi's general view on cultivation and his claim that human nature has problematic tendency.

Section 4C (Room 1075, 7/F, 1645-1745)

Moderator: Dobin CHOI, The University of Iowa

Paper I

Knowing (*zhī*, 知) as ‘Connecting’ (*jiē*, 接): Discussions of Perceptual Knowledge in Early Chinese Philosophy

Dennis SCHILLING

Department of Chinese Philosophy, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China

Abstract

This paper aims to discuss the conceptual pattern of ‘connecting’ (*jiē*, 接) used in the Mohist *Canon* as well in the *Xún zǐ* to describe what ‘knowing’ (*zhī*, 知) is or how is it possible that we do know. ‘Knowing as connecting’ appears in epistemological, psychological, anthropological and ethical contexts. Bringing these different perspectives in a comprehensive picture together, the paper relates this conceptual pattern to questions like “*what* is knowing”—taking ‘connecting’ as a description for knowing—, “*how* do we know?”—taking ‘connecting’ as the procedure of knowing—, and “*how* does knowing defines our life?” —taking ‘connecting’ as a biological *modus* given to human and animal life.

The paper starts with a brief explanation why *jiē* (接) should be understood as ‘connecting’ rather than ‘receiving’, and how ‘connecting’ is considered to be related to sense perception. As sensual faculties ‘connect’ with their sensual objects, the heart or the faculty of knowing becomes ‘connected’ with the objects of the outer world. Subsequently, the epistemological and psychological descriptions of knowing as connecting will be discussed. Since different kinds of knowing are distinguished according to their reliability, reliability provides a means to distinguish specific features of knowing as connecting. Furthermore, since ‘knowing’ is related to life in general, and ‘knowing as connecting’ yields living beings to act in a specific way looking for desirable goods to fulfill their drives, ‘knowing as connecting’ refers to questions in moral epistemology and psychology.

Paper II

The Mystery about the Beginning and Astonishment of Existence: comparing Kuki Shuzo and several Western Thoughts

OKINAGA Takashi

Department of Japanese Culture, Faculty of Letters, Teikyo University

Abstract

In this paper, we examine the thoughts of Japanese and western philosophers on the metaphysical question about the beginning of the universe. The mystery of the beginning of the universe is brought out when we reach a limit point which is situated at the initial event of a causal series and whose cause we can no longer explain, after inspecting that series.

However, even when we notice a mystery that there is an event without an identifiable cause, a certain linear form of causes is required for such a mystical event to be noticed. This form is the very condition of that mystical event, although it is already a certain conceptual form. And there is no cause from where such a form itself has been appeared.

So, in the first section, we examine the “Separated Chance (離接的偶然)”, which Kuki regarded as the chance of the creation of the universe. Then we investigate Kuki’s method of dealing with the mystery brought about from such a linear, causal series.

Next, in the 2nd section, we focus on Whitehead’s “Principle of Limitation” as a thought dealing with the origin of the causal series itself. Because, this very series makes the creation mystical.

Then, in the 3rd section, we investigate Bergson’s “dureé pure” as an example of the origin itself of such a series, and confirm the groundlessness of this “dureé”.

Research Interests

Pragmatism (especially William James), metaphysics, modern Japanese philosophy, science and religion

Dec. 15, 2019 (Day 2)

Section 5A (Room 1073, 7/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Foong-Ee PONG, Soochow University

Paper I

**The Supreme Self-Regarding Virtue:
Mengzi's Flood-like Qi and Hume's Greatness of Mind"**

Dobin CHOI

Department of Philosophy, The University of Iowa

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that Mengzi's and Hume's identical moral foundation of sentiment makes them envisage the supreme self-regarding virtues, developed from a proper moral sentiment toward the self. Both philosophers believe that our concentration on sentiment either develops or determines virtue. In general, sentiments are projected to intentional objects, and virtues are considered as agents' moral characters. Thus, the main objects of agents' virtue-related sentiment are the character traits of themselves and others. As moral agents, we contemplate our ingrained characters, which would also arouse sentiments of approval or disapproval. Simply put, we feel shame and pride toward ourselves. If we eschew what is shameful and encourage what is proud, our character traits would be developed to be virtuous. For both Mengzi and Hume, this process of self-regulation is a method for cultivating self-regarding virtues. Mengzi's righteousness stems from the heart of shame and disdain, while Hume's passion of pride, when properly regulated by reflective thinking, advances to virtue. Hume sees that when the instances of "well-regulated pride" are accumulated in the self, we can achieve the greatness of mind. This supreme virtue reminds us of Mencius's pride in nourishing the flood-like qi, only nurtured through one's continuous accumulation of yi (集義). I argue that these self-regarding virtues comprise the distinctive features of both philosophers' sentiment-based accounts of virtue, ultimately founded upon the natural constitution of the human mind.

Research Interests

Comparative Philosophy, Ethics, and Early Modern Philosophy

Paper II

Nishida's and Mou Zongsan's view of the Logical Genesis

ASAKURA Tomomi

Kobe City University of Foreign Studies

Abstract

This presentation analyzes the logical genesis or the generation of logic from an East Asian perspective by comparing the theories of logical positing—in other words, the deduction of categories—by Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan. It is well-known that these philosophers developed their own views on logic by regarding volition as the ground for the act of consciousness and seeing the subjective-objective opposition as the product of our free will in

a manner similar to the post-Kantians. Nishida investigates the way logical forms and constitutive categories are produced from the self-determination of nothing as the limit of reality and its concrete origin. Mou's view, on the other hand, heavily draws on the analytic tradition to reformulate the Kantian theory of the primacy of practical reason, which strikingly differs from Nishida's so-called irrationalism. I shall show why these different approaches to the logical genesis nevertheless converge to the theory of intellectual intuition that leads to the revived interest in East Asian Buddhism.

Paper III

Chinese philosophy in France: From its beginnings to recent debates

ZHANG Yijing

Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University

Abstract

The theme of this paper has in part been inspired by recent developments in Francophone Sinology. Since the publication of J.-F. Billeter's *Contre François Jullien* (2006), French speaking Sinologists seemed to have collectively rejected comparative philosophy which treats China as the Other (*altérité*) of the West. It is debatable, however, whether scholars trained in Western humanities can avoid comparatism or Eurocentric reference points in their interpretation of Chinese philosophy.

To explain this phenomenon, I trace the history and development of studies on Chinese philosophy in France from its beginnings in the seventeenth century until the present day, underlining the shift from comparatism to anti-comparatism and analyzing some inconsistencies between the methodological claims of Sinologists and their actual practices. Firstly, when Jesuit missionaries translated Confucian texts into Latin and tried to establish similarities between the Confucianism and Christianity, their translation resulted in the perception of China as an "other" among European philosophers. Secondly, while rejecting comparatism and the view that there are no abstract concepts in Chinese thinking, some contemporary French Sinologists emphasize the relationship between Chinese thinking and the form of life (*mode de vie*). Nevertheless, the empirical dimension of the latter is precisely one of the reasons for the statement on the absence of abstract thinking in China. Finally, some anti-comparatist Sinologists unwittingly use Western concepts and perspectives in their translation or research without realizing that this use is a kind of comparatism.

Research Interests

Greek-Chinese comparative philosophy, translation and reception of Western/Chinese philosophy in China/Europe, hermeneutics and translation studies

Section 5B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Miikael-Aadam LOTMAN, Kyoto University

Paper I

Nishida on "time": remarks from Wittgenstein

Florencia Andrea DI ROCCO VALDECANTOS
Global Research Center for Logic and Sensibility
Faculty of Letters, Keio University

Abstract

This lecture inquiries Nishida's presentation of the nature of "time", in his rudimentary theory "Expressive activity" (表現作用, 1925), edited as an essay in *From That Which Acts to That Which Sees* (働くものから見るものへ), at a "grammatical level". It inquiries if Nishida's position is an example of what Wittgenstein calls "the myth of the specious present" (more technically, the "instantaneous solipsism"): the idea that only the experience of the present moment is real ("Nur die Erfahrung des gegenwärtigen Augenblicks hat Realität", *Philosophische Bemerkungen*, §54).

While in the first sections, Nishida seems to defend a realism of time, relying on the fact that "substantial nature constitutes a mechanistic unity, on the basis of each element's being allotropic" (tr. W. Haver, 2012, even if the original text austere claims that "物質的自然は各要素のが同質的となることによって機械的統一を完成するのである"), he nevertheless later argues a clear indissociability between "acting" (働く) and "time" (時間), in a standpoint which remains close, to some extent, to a pragmatic approach, as sketched by Wittgenstein after *Tractatus*.

We would try to show how despite some similarities, Nishida adds an exigence to "time", more technically, to "personal time" : its "successivity" claims its "unrepeatability", a feature which seems not to rely on a language-game rule. To conclude, we will try to understand if Nishida's "theological" remarks can lead us out from the myth of the present.

Research Interests

Philosophy of language and logic

Paper II

The Self as Another Person:

Some readings and questions in the genre of "personal account" (zizhuan 自傳) in the Chinese Tradition

Stéphane Feuillas 飛颺
Department of Asian Studies, University Paris-Diderot
East Asian Civilisations Research Centre - CRCAO

Abstract

A lot of studies have been devoted to the expression and constitution of the self in the Chinese tradition, about his vanishing, his emerging position or his progressive self-assessment in the process of the cultivation of one's person. But very rarely has a special tradition that begins in the 4th century onwards until the very beginning of the 20th century been mobilized and a set of texts been read in that respect, namely the so-called *zizhuan* 自傳 or "personal account" written

by scholars expressing some major aspirations and commitment without resorting to the first person but instead engaging the description and assertiveness of oneself in and through the grammatical third person.

The aim of this paper is therefore to present and study some major texts of this textual tradition including the famous *Wuliu xiansheng zhuan* 五柳先生傳 written by Tao Yuanming 陶淵明 (365-427), texts by Lu Guimeng 陸龜蒙 (?-881), by Liu Yuxi 劉禹錫 (772-842), by Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 (1007-1072) and other Song and Ming Dynasties scholars in order to ask these simple but puzzling questions: what does it make to the self to choose to express oneself in the construction of a persona in the third person; to what extent the inner part of the self should be in a way fictitious and fictional? How are we to understand the split between the self and his double? Centered around those issues, the paper will nevertheless carefully take into account in this inquiry the very condition of speech of each time and dynasty.

Research Topics

In the continuity of our Ph.D thesis on the links between nature and morality in the thought of Zhang Zai (1020-1078), I expanded the scope of my work to the modalities of "philosophical" reflection in the eleventh century. The studies focused on discourse strategies developed at that time to state, in a context strongly codified, new theses, and more particularly on the links between thought and literature at that time. It is within this framework that I directed seminars on the expression of the ideal in commemorative texts (*ji* 記), the reading of the *Classic of Change* under the Northern Song and the various forms of Song poetry. The ultimate goal is to reconfigure the expression of thought under the Northern Song, to redefine "writing" (*wen*) at this time and to show how the so-called literary texts constitute the place of another problematization of philosophical that does not account for the more stereotypical writings (comments, briefs, short treatises). The case of Su Dongpo (1037-1101) was particularly studied and has given rise to several publications. It allowed to put in light different problems: the notion of image, the role of figures hexagrammatic approaches, the original approaches to self-cultivation, the nature of the debates theoretical. These different themes have since been the subject of partial studies using of text as diverse as the comments by diagrams of the *Changes* under the Song, the invention of divinatory book like *Qianxu* 潛虛 [The latent Void] of Sima Guang (1019-1086).

Paper III

Decentering the State and Envisioning Democratic Socialism: Zhang Dongsun's Philosophy of Socialism in 1920's China

Soonyi LEE

Department of Humanities, Mercy College

Abstract

This paper explores the global circulation of pluralist philosophies of socialism after the Great War by examining how the Chinese philosopher and journalist Zhang Dongsun advocated guild socialism in 1920s China. As he reflected on the global catastrophe of the Great War, Zhang criticized the wartime alliance between capitalism and the state and engaged with the postwar theory of socialist pluralism espoused by British thinkers such as G. D. H. Cole and Harold Laski. Based upon their faith in the autonomy of associations freely formed by citizens, pluralists advocated the devolution of power and administrative capacity to autonomous functional bodies. By analyzing *The Study of Socialism*, a magazine supplement to *China Times*, which Zhang founded in September 1921, my paper illuminates how Zhang

proposed guild socialism as a decentralized, democratic form of socialism. Just as British thinkers presented their pluralist theory in opposition to Fabian collectivism, Zhang's advocacy of guild socialism was in reaction to the collectivist arguments of Marxist-Leninism, whose influence was rapidly growing in China during this time. Departing from conventional approaches to Chinese intellectual history, which focus on China's reception of "advanced" Western ideas, my paper concentrates on the synchronicity of British and Chinese versions of guild socialism and argues that Chinese philosophy of guild socialism formed part of a worldwide postwar critique of state power and mounted a challenge to the Marxist theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Section 5C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: Thomas MICHAEL, Beijing Normal University

Organized Panel:

Oneness, Lingering, and Constancy: Three Approaches to Daoist Cultivation

Panel Abstract

Over the last two decades, the modern study of Daoism has begun to break new ground and gain a much wider academic recognition than at any time in the past. This is due to a variety of reasons, including the growing number of ancient Chinese excavated texts that speak directly to the formative stages of Daoism, the coming together with Daoism of the philosophical trends and methodologies from Continental Philosophy, and a deepening familiarity of the religiously based roles and functions of bodily practices. This panel, “Oneness, Lingering, and Constancy: Three Approaches to Daoist Cultivation,” presents an experimental attempt to demonstrate the continuity of all three approaches (philological, philosophical, and physiological) from the earliest origins of Daoism to its full display in the Song Dynasty. Unlike many other world religious or philosophical traditions, Daoism is primarily distinguished by the priority it gives to cultivation, and the three papers of this panel attempt to situate each of their individual topics and concerns (philological, philosophical, and physiological) within the wider rubrics of what can be considered “Daoist cultivation.” This is done in the effort to further develop the modern study of Daoism by exploring these three separate but very much related regions of its practice and deployment.

Paper I

Cultivating the One in *Fanwu liuxing* and *Huangdi Sijing*

Sharon SMALL

School of Philosophy, East China Normal University

Abstract

Excavated materials from Mawangdui and the cache of manuscripts held in the Shanghai Museum show us that the notion of “one” or “oneness” held a significant position in early Daoist theories of cosmic generation, political conduct, and perhaps most importantly—bodily practices. Unlike its later developments, bodily practices in early Daoism were not proposed for seeking longevity or a better and healthier life, but rather for the purpose of gaining true knowledge. True knowledge is none other than knowledge of Dao—something we can attain by grasping its oneness. Thus, the term “one” in the *Fanwu liuxing* 凡物流形 becomes the core notion of the text which does not only instruct us to “examine oneness” (*cha yi* 察一), “attain oneness” (*deyi* 得一), and “guard oneness” (*shou yi* 守一) but also tells us that oneness is the beginning of the cosmos and the basis for all existence. The *Huangdi Sijing* 黃帝四經 employs a similar terminology of “grasping the one” (*zhi yi* 執一) to provide an epistemological basis for its political purposes. The ruler then can only rule if he perceives oneness. Based on these two texts, this paper offers an exploration into the methods of bodily cultivation that bring about knowledge of “oneness,” as well as the significance of knowing the “one” and its necessity for proper political conduct.

Paper II
The Lingering Dao in the Excavated Versions of the *Laozi*

Thomas MICHAEL
School of Philosophy, Beijing Normal University

Abstract

When the Han Emperor Liu Heng 劉恒 assumed the throne in 179 BCE, the term *heng* 恒 became prohibited. In the case of the *Laozi*, this necessitated that a different character be substituted for it, and thus did the text have its every use of *heng* 恒 changed to *chang* 常. It took over two thousand years for it to be finally discovered that the term *chang* did not hold a natural place in every instance of its use in the *Laozi*. Even today, although *heng* and *chang* are different characters, many scholars continue to assume that they are synonyms for each other, and the 1973 discovery of the Mawangdui versions of the *Laozi*, followed by the 1993 discovery of the Guodian versions of the *Laozi*, have not produced adequate understandings of what was at stake in this substitution. Noting the slew of other ancient Daoist excavated texts that also give the term *heng* a prominent role, this paper offers a deeper exploration of the ancient uses of the two terms, and it attempts to uncover an earlier set of meanings pertaining to the *Laozi* that cohere around the meaning of *heng* as “lingering” with particular respect to characterizations of the Dao, and *chang* as “constant regularity” with particular respect to the cultivated body.

Paper III
Constancy as Balance in a Dynamic Universe

Livia KOHN
Department of Religion, Boston University

Abstract

The idea of constancy implies steadiness, permanence, and stability. The Chinese universe being one of never-ceasing, ongoing dynamic change, there is little room for it other than as a characteristic of Dao before cosmic unfolding. Still, constancy is important and plays a major role in Daoist thought, only it is envisioned in terms of the balance, harmony, or homeostasis of varying forces of change—notably yin and yang as well as the sun and the moon, key factors that structure space and time. While it is the natural tendency of these forces to gravitate toward constancy as balance, human beings have to make concerted efforts to match this, leading to extensive sets of practices and organized systems of self-cultivation. The goal is to attain a level of constancy co-equal with heaven and earth, which will afford ongoing transformation and eternal life. Focusing on Song-dynasty documents on internal alchemy, this presentation will outline the Daoist understanding of dynamic change and describe some core practices. It will link these with psychological concepts of a set point of human happiness and the understanding in neuroscience that the brain to always balances any activities or tendencies that go beyond its basic homeostasis.

Section 5D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1025-1155)

Moderator: KONO Tetsuya, Rikkyo University

Organized Panel:

Proposing New Perspectives on “Intercorporeality” from East-Asian Philosophical Viewpoint

Panel Abstract

The notion of embodiment is playing a growing role in various areas of contemporary philosophy, as well as in other related fields such as cognitive science, robotics, and clinical psychology. In the past two decades, this new trend based on the notion of embodiment have proposed innovative perspectives that could reform classical Western dualistic thinking on the relation between mind and body, such as “extended mind”(Clark, Chalmers, Wilson, and so on), “radical embodiment theory” (Chemero), “enactivism”(Noe, Thompson), and so on. These new ideas clearly have a common, similar perspective on the mind-body relationship as that of East-Asian philosophy. Some of the researchers have been deeply influenced especially by Buddhist thoughts. However, these new ideas in contemporary philosophy have been rarely applied to the domain of interpersonal relationship, intersubjectivity, caring, and so on without some exceptions (Gallagher, Miyahara, Kono, Fuchs). In this panel, we shall propose a new perspective of “intercorporeality,” or embodied interpersonal relationship from East-Asian philosophical viewpoint. We never intend to merely introduce and interpret classical notions and theories of Eastern thought, but to integrate Eastern thoughts with contemporary theories in philosophy, psychology and other empirical research. The goal of this panel, accordingly, is to contribute to the further elucidation of the concept of embodiment and the theoretical development on intercorporeality, in innovating these concepts from East-Asian philosophical perspectives.

Paper I

The Concept of Ma and Maai in Zeami and Munenori Yagyu

KONO Tetsuya

Department of Education, Rikkyo University

Abstract

In this presentation, I shall to try to clarify from the standpoint of contemporary phenomenology, the essential features of the phenomenon of ma (間) and maai (間合い). I shall delineate their cultural and philosophical implications by interpreting and comparing the treatises of Noh by Motokiyo Zeami and the book of swordsmanship by Munenori Yagyu. Munenori has been a legendary swordsman and one of the founders of the Yagyu Shinkage-ryu style of sword in the early era Edo. Under the influence of Zeami, Munenori stressed the importance to seize the “musical” cadence between his action and that of the opponent. Both Zeami and Munenori pointed out that there are three musical momenta relating to ma: one is duration or indivisible movement, another is beat, and third is rhythm. Ma is the musical distance that prepares the advent of the future. It is a phenomenon which cannot grasped by a dualistic conceptualization of object and subject; it is a phenomenon of temporalization which brings a future event and makes the present the past. Ma is an intersubjective occasion that provides us with an empty and silent place in order to encounter the other. Finally, I shall conclude that ma is finally defined as enduring power or indivisible movement of life whose essence resides in musicality; indivisible movement of life articulates itself as rhythms. Maai is an encounter of a power of life with that of the other.

Research interests
Philosophy and Ethics

Paper II
The Embodiment of the “Mind” in Neo-Confucianism

ITO Takayuki
International Research Center for Japanese Studies

Abstract

In research on China’s pre-modern thought to date, we typically see Chu Hsi’s (朱熹 ; 朱子) thought understood as prioritizing “principle”, and the teachings of Wang Yang-ming (王守仁 ; 陽明) as giving more weight to “mind”. From here the shift or development from Chu Hsi’s teaching towards Wang Yang-ming is located within a historical process towards modernity. Regardless of if they take a negative or affirmative stance, the understanding of Wang Yang-ming’s teaching as being a kind of idealist philosophy of the “mind” has been quite dominant. In other words, what is common here is lack of appreciation for a practical “embodiment” which both of these schools of thought equally took as a premise and concern. In fact, what they saw as essential was the practice of “ritual”, which made possible the reciprocal mediation of the other, guaranteeing the objectivity of the training itself. Given this is so, they could hardly neglect the “body” of each individual as that place where “ritual” is carried out. Thus “mind” is not originally something which easily fits with the Cartesian dualism of modern Western philosophy with its “inner” and “outer”, “subjective” and “objective”, “mind” and “body”. Rather, it is much closer to concepts deployed in the theories of embodiment of contemporary philosophy. We need to give consideration to the fact that “ritual”, while subsuming desire, is originally that which governs the embodied self. That it is in fact a being-for-others, an intersubjective social mechanism.

Research Interests

Chinese Philosophy, History of Pre-modern Chinese thought, Cultural Interaction in East Asia

Paper III
Intercorporeality and *Aida*: An alternative view of social understanding

TANAKA Shogo
Center for Liberal Arts, Tokai University

Abstract

Intercorporeality is a potentially resonant relation between one’s own body and that of another. It is important to note that in the background to this notion lies the so-called “problem of other minds.” When Merleau-Ponty (1945/2012) writes, “everything happens as if the other person’s intention inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body” (p. 191), he refers to the corporeally intertwined dimension between the self and the other, which fundamentally transforms the problem of other mind. It is a common experience, for example, that we cannot help yawning when we see someone else yawn. That is, perceiving the other’s action prompts the same action in the self or its possibility, and conversely, the self’s action prompts the same action or its possibility in the other’s body. In this regard, intercorporeality is the primary route

of social understanding, in which the other person never appears as Cartesian mind hidden behind its body. In this presentation, I would like to further elaborate the theoretical implications of intercorporeality by connecting it with Bin Kimura's notion of *aida* (Kimura, 2005). Although both notions emphasize the sensory-motor, perceptual, and non-conceptual aspects of social understanding, *aida* rather focuses on the autonomous process that emerges through embodied interactions between self and other(s). When the intersubjective *aida* maintains its autonomy, it operates in an auto-productive manner. Through ongoing embodied interactions, the process itself implies the subsequent phase, and the interactants implicitly know what is expected in the situation. This means that *aida* involves its own normativity, through which the participants are able to develop detailed and nuanced social understanding with each other.

Research interests

Phenomenology, mind-body theory, cognitive science

Paper IV

Individuality and Sociality of the Subject in Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji

INUTSUKA Yū

Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to compare Merleau-Ponty and Watsuji Tetsurō's understanding of the subject in relation to social interaction. Against the idea of atomic individual, both philosophers point out two moments of the subject, individuality and sociality. Merleau-Ponty calls them "the generality and the individuality of the subject, subjectivity qualified and pure" (1945, p. 514). In his texts, we can find his rather negative evaluation towards our social nature. We inevitably characterize each other and behave "as" a wife, a friend, a French, and so forth. This characterization may be considered as "violence" that denies individuals' freedom. In contrast, Watsuji sees that the twofold characteristics of subjective human existence (*shutaitteki ningen sonzai*), individuality and sociality, are the source of human ethics as they enable our trust relationship. Based on a subjective "betweenness" (*aidagara*, human relationship), we can interact even among strangers. The core of Watsuji's ethics is his understanding of the nature of human action (*kōi*) which cannot be explained by mere physical movement nor unilateral intentionality but an expression of subjective betweenness by objective bodies. A comparison of these two philosophers gives us a better understanding of our sociality and its positive and negative aspects.

Research Interests

Modern Japanese philosophy, environmental philosophy and phenomenology

Section 6A (Room 1083, 8/F, 1445-1615)

Moderator: SHINO Yoshinobu, Meiji University

Organized Panel:

Taiwanese Philosophy in the Japanese Colonial Period

In recent years, two remarkable results are published on Taiwanese philosophy in the Japanese colonial period. One is *Existential Engagement: Philosophy in Taiwan, the Japanese Era* (存在交渉：日治時期的臺灣哲學, 2016), edited by Hung Tzu-Wei, and another is *Enlightenment and Rebellion: 100 years of Taiwanese Philosophy* (啓蒙與反叛：臺灣哲學的百年浪潮, 2019) edited by Hung Tzu-Wei and Deng Duen-Min. This panel aims to explore further study along this line of research. In particular, three panelists pick up three Taiwanese thinkers who lived under the Japanese rule and had experience to have studied in Japan. This panel will show not only their transcultural background, but also the depth and the diversity of Taiwanese philosophy at that period.

Paper I

曾景來「善惡根源論」的佛教倫理學義蘊

嚴瑋泓

東海大學哲學系

摘要

曾景來（1902-1977）乃臺灣於戰前時期第一位具有大學學歷的佛教知識份子。他 1920 開始留學日本，並於 1928 年以〈阿含の佛陀觀〉為題的畢業論文畢業於駒澤大學，是戰前臺灣佛教重要人物之一，也是此時期臺灣佛教哲學的領航者。本篇論文將分析曾景來「善惡根源論」的思想與論證，指出他的佛教倫理觀乃受到不同哲學思想的啟發，其中包含了緣起論、佛性論、王陽明的心性論、康德的最高善以及忽滑谷快天的禪學思想。最後，本文將論述曾景來善惡觀對於佛教倫理學的探究有什麼樣的啟發性意義。

Paper II

Lin Maosheng's Philosophy of Education and its background

SHINO Yoshinobu

School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University

Abstract

Lin Maosheng (林茂生, 1887-1947), a Taiwanese philosopher, after having studied Yangmingism at Tokyo imperial university, got Ph. D at Columbia University in 1929. The title of his doctoral dissertation is "Public Education in Formosa under the Japanese Administration". His study on education is quite largely influenced by J. Dewey and seems to have little connection with his former study on Yangmingism. However, education has been one of major topics of Confucianism, and it is worth comparing his philosophy of education with traditional Confucianism. This paper attempts to reread his doctoral thesis from the view point of Confucianism, especially of Yangmingism.

Research Interests

Chinese philosophy and Japanese philosophy

Paper III

論曾天從「真理自體的純粹形相」

黃文宏

國立清華大學哲學研究所

摘要

曾天從（1910-2007）是台灣日治時期主要的哲學家之一，然而其哲學仍然為我們今日的哲學界所遺忘。在本論文中，我們將重心置於其主要的哲學著作（出版於 1937 年的《真理原理論》）。在這本著作中，曾天從開啓了一個真理論的領域，並且創造出一種關於真理原理的理論來作為其哲學體系的基礎。因而要了解並評價其對哲學的貢獻，我們有必要了解其對真理原理的解明。在筆者看來，曾天從的整個哲學的事業皆集中在這個論題的釐清上。然而由於純粹現實學的體系仍然是未完成的，這一點讓曾天從哲學的洞見、以及許多哲學的概念仍然處於晦暗之中。在本文中，我們將集中在真理自體的領域，致力釐清真理自體的純粹形相。筆者在本論文的目標在透過釐清其概念、強化其論證方式，以解明曾天從對哲學的洞見。

On Zeng, Tianzong's "The Pure Eidos of Truth-in-itself"

Abstract

Zeng Tianzong (1910-2007) is one of the major Taiwanese philosophers in Japanese ruled period, whose philosophy is still forgotten in our philosophical circle. In this article I will put my focus on his main philosophical work, "Theory of the Principle of Truth" (published in 1937), in which he opens an alethiological area and creates a theory of the principle of truth, which serves as a basis for his own philosophical system. Therefore to understand and evaluate his contribution to philosophy, it is important to know his explication of the principle of truth. It is the author's view that his entire philosophical career served to enlighten this thesis. But his plan is still unfinished, which makes some of his creative thoughts and philosophical concepts still in obscure. In this article I will focus on the area of "Truth-in-itself" and clarify its "Pure Eidos". This is the main area of truth which unifies the entire reality. My primary aim in this article is to shed light on Zeng's insight, through explicating his concepts and reinforcing his arguments.

Research Interests

Phenomenology

Section 6B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1445-1545)

Moderator: Michael James HEMMINGSEN, University of Guam

Paper I

A Different Kind of Authenticity: The Kyoto School's View of the Self and the Importance of Self-transformation

Lehel BALOGH

Department of Ethics, Hokkaido University

Abstract

Authenticity as an ethical ideal—as well as a general non-moral objective towards which the modern self is being directed—has been featuring increasingly prominently in western societies during the past two centuries, despite the salient fact that no one really knows what authenticity means. Standard characterizations of this highly elusive notion refer us habitually to the divergent ideas of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre, albeit the contemporary usage of the term seems to have more in common with the descriptions of self-actualization and self-realization emblematic of the existentialist-humanistic psychology of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow. Whereas the definition of authenticity is far from clear-cut and lucid, it is, nevertheless, evident that it supports the individual to become more affirmative of its own self. Authenticity appears both as a theoretical principle and as a practical ideal that encourages the expansion of the self, while, at the same time, emphasizes the autonomous and self-reliant quality of those people who have “truly become” themselves. But is this the only viable account that can be conceived of authenticity? Isn't there a differing interpretation out there, *a different kind of authenticity*, which could challenge the established understanding of this concept? The philosophies of Nishida Kitaro, Tanabe Hajime and Nishitani Keiji hold the key to this inquiry. In my paper I propose to investigate how the Kyoto School philosophers' reflections on the self and self-transformation, emptiness and nothingness could offer a feasible—and possibly preferable—alternative to the customary interpretation of authenticity as self-enlargement.

Research Interests

Asian philosophies (Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism); comparative philosophy and ethics; comparative religions; environmental philosophy and ethics; existential philosophy; Japanese philosophy (Nishida, Tanabe, Nishitani); phenomenology; philosophy of psychiatry and psychotherapy; religious philosophy

Paper II

Watsuji's Practical Philosophy as a Virtue Ethics

Yōsuke TAKEHANA

Ōtani University

Abstract

As is symbolized by the fact that Nishida named his maiden work *An Inquiry into the Good* because he considered the puzzle of life as the ultimate question of philosophy, practical philosophies in modern Japan has a feature as virtue ethics. For it claims that not the action itself but the actor of it, in other words, not how to act but how to live matters in moral problems. Among many practical philosophies in modern Japan, the ethics of Watsuji Tetsurō (和辻哲郎, 1889-1960) has the highest affinity to virtue ethics. Watsuji evaluates the

communal relationships or the roles (in his term, *Aidagara* 間柄) in the communities where we live and considers each person as sharpening its own personality through it, as MacIntyre does. In this presentation, we attempt to interpret Watsuji's moral philosophy as a virtue ethics focusing on the similarity between Watsuji and MacIntyre, and point out that Watsuji's notion *trust* (信頼) is of crucial importance when trying to understand his practical philosophy as a virtue ethics. The fusion of fact and norm in his ethics, which is often criticized as the fallacy of confusing the totally distinguished phases, should be regarded rather as its prominence if we pay attention to the concept of trust from the perspective of virtue ethics. In his opinion, the trust is what is required to be justified or fulfilled (in this sense, the trust is nothing but a norm) and simultaneously what has formed our individuality through the experiences of struggling to justify it (in this sense, it acquires the character of fact). To use MacIntyre's concept, we cannot narrate our own stories in the communities without the trust.

Research Interests

Modern Japanese philosophy, especially philosophy of Kyoto School, continental philosophy, virtue Ethics, philosophy of death

Section 6C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1445-1615)

Moderator: **Ellie Hua WANG**, National Chengchi University

Paper I

Ritual and Confucian Shame

Ellie Hua WANG

Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University

Abstract

Ritual practices and shame both play important roles in Confucianism and in the Chinese culture in general. Early Confucians, starting from Confucius, already stress the relation between the two. However, there has been a criticism that the emphasis on the role of ritual renders Confucian shame an “external”, “outward-looking” attitude, and thus not satisfying the moral ideal of autonomy and inferior to “inward-looking” attitudes such as guilt. In this paper, I address this criticism by first attending to replies made by Roetz and Shun. I then point out my dissatisfaction with Roetz’s “autonomy interpretation” and Seok and Geaney’s “tactile interpretation” of Shun’s view on Confucian shame, and develop my own interpretation, the Agent-Contact view, with attention to Confucian texts, including the *Analects*, the *Mencius*, the *Xunzi*, and the *Book of Rites*. I argue that Confucian shame is a cultivated virtue through learning and ritual practices. It results from a feeling of lack with regard to agency through contact with otherness, which includes other people and the world as a whole. The fact that the early Confucians think that we are (and should be) able to feel shame in this way tells us their notion of the self, and how it can (and should) relate to the world through cultivation. Understood in this way, one opposition to Confucian shame is not pride, but a form of reverence (jin 敬).

Research Interests

Chinese philosophy, moral psychology, ethics and value theory

Paper II

Moral Extension and Human Vocation in Fichte and Confucianism

Plato TSE

Department of Philosophy, National Chengchi University

Abstract

Mencius’ notion of moral extension is key to his ethical view and moral psychology. It is the mental process by which one recognizes the ethically relevant similarity shared by different persons and on this basis treats them and reacts to them equally. Moral feeling and individual effort are its subjective conditions; satisfaction of physical needs and freedom from the fear of violence are its objective conditions. The practice of moral extension shall lead to the harmony of social order and relationships as well as the cultivation of one’s human disposition.

In this paper, I argue that some transcendental reasoning is implicit in Confucianism when individual cultivation is laid down as the basis for the well governance of a state. Moral extension, and along with it the cultivation of moral feeling, is the necessary condition for individual cultivation. From a transcendental perspective, Fichte’s view on feeling and ideal as the a priori fundamental basis of intuition could offer useful resources for systematic organization in the Confucian moral psychology. Conversely, from a Confucian perspective,

one may find in Fichte's *Lectures on the Vocation of Scholar* an important supplement to the Confucian conception of human roles. It is part of the human disposition to strive to know, and from those who are enlightened we seek to learn. In this light, 'scholar' (*der Gelehrte*) takes on a more general sense and means more than just a profession – it is a non-familial human role in the universal pursuit of cognitive extension.

Research Interests

German idealism, transcendental philosophy, philosophy of mind and metaphysics

Paper III 再探韓非道論

詹 康
政治大學哲學系

摘要

中國哲學史的研究對於韓非有個罕見的「歧視」，那就是很多學者以為他沒有道論可談，主要原因大概是一種相沿成習的偏見。

至於承認韓非有道論的學者，對其道論的詮釋非常分歧，大略有以下幾種解說：一、君術；「道生法」。二、規律。三、生成說，與生成加規律說。四、自然總體加生成說。五、本體（形而上學而非宇宙論）。六、氣論。七、模糊、不詳的解說。

蔣重躍 2013 年《古代中國人關於事物本體的發現：「稽」字的哲學之旅》是近年關於韓非道論的力作，此文將關鍵擺在「稽」字，是至為正確的做法。可是蔣重躍的解釋不合於韓非的原文，因此不能令人滿意。

我們根據現代工具書《漢語大字典》與《故訓匯纂》可以查出「稽」字的所有詞義，再審酌韓非關於「道之情」的說法，提出道應是無，而「稽」字採用合、同義，可以讀通韓非關於道、物、理的相關原文。

韓非以無為道，成為其修養論與統御術的基礎，道與德、氣的關係也可因此而說明得更清楚。

Section 6D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1445-1615)

Moderator: KAZASHI Nobuo, Dalian University of Technology

Organized Panel:

Japanese Thought (Miki, Watsuji, and Maruyama) as Encountered in the Philippines: On Translation, Nation, and Critique

Panel Abstract

The Philippines is not usually included in the East Asia region, but it was part of the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” from 1940 till Japan’s defeat. For that reason, it would provide a unique perspective on Japanese thought to reflect not only on Japanese involvements in the area during the war but also on some burgeoning philosophical exchanges between Filipino scholars and Japanese thought regarding the questions of translation, nation, and critique, in particular.

In this regard, philosopher Miki Kiyoshi is of great significance because of his ten-month stay in the Philippines as a correspondent staff of the Japanese Army in 1942; his encounter with the local people and the reality of the war exerted such decisive influences on him that he was forced to reconsider the basic orientation and ideas of his philosophy from the ground up.

Thus, first we look at the significance of Miki’s experience in the Philippines for his last thinking and some possible effects it could have had on post-war Japanese thought if he had survived without dying as a political prisoner in 1945. Then, two Filipino scholars will present their reading of some central texts by Watsuji Tetsuro and Maruyama Masao together with students’ reactions they received when they taught about these thinkers in the Philippines. It is hoped that this session will become an occasion to shed new light on the significance of Japanese thought in the East Asian contexts from an angle not so much explored till today. Discussion is to be initiated by some questions and comments by Odagiri Takushi, who has been working on a variety of subjects related to Japanese thought.

Paper I

Miki Kiyoshi in the Philippines: Toward a Radical Transformation of “Concrete Philosophy”

KAZASHI Nobuo

Department of Philosophy, Dalian University of Technology

Abstract

Miki Kiyoshi aimed to form a “concrete philosophy” that can engage adequately with the concrete realities of the historical world; the key concepts he employed for that purpose were “dialectics of pathos and logos,” “logic of imagination,” “neo-humanism,” “social body,” etc. Through his experiences in the Philippines, however, he came to fully realize that his thinking in these terms was far from “concrete” particularly in the face of the harsh reality of the war; most of the philosophical thinking going on in Japan then, including his own, turned out nothing more than an abstract “idealism in the rear.”

Since Miki had to die a tragic death in late September in 1945 while still held as a political prisoner, we cannot know what sort of “new logic” he could have created if he had lived on into the post-war years. But some essays and talks he left after returning from the Philippines give us some clues to it.

Thus, first I will delineate the impacts of Miki’s Filipino days on his thinking and the new direction it was heading for. (Cf. HIRAKO Tomonaga, “Miki Kiyoshi and Japan’s Occupation

of the Philippines” in *Miki Kiyoshi as a Legacy*, 2008; in Japanese) Then, I shall try to bring into light some contemporary significance his philosophical trajectory can have in reference to the discussion of technology, fiction, and emotion in *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow* (2017) by Yuval Noah Harari.

Paper II

Watsuji's Ethics from Filipino Eyes: Two Tensions in the Good Life

Anton Luis SEVILLA

Graduate School of Human-Environmental Sciences, Kyushu University

Abstract

Drawing from my experience of teaching Watsuji Tetsurô at the Ateneo de Manila University, as well as growing literature on Philippine values (as in Manuel B. Dy, Jr., *Values in Philippine Culture and Education*), I find that Watsuji's view of human being and becoming can be deeply relevant, not just as a way to understand exotic Japan, but as a way for people in the Philippines to come to terms with their own ethical lives. I focus on the notion of *tension* (or “negation”) in Watsuji's ethics, and show how two tensions seem to manifest in the Philippines. The first tension is between individuality and community, which can be traced philosophically to the tension between western, liberal ideas, and with Philippine ideas of “fellows, *kapwa*” and Confucian influences. The second tension is between the subjective/internal and the objective/practical aspects of life, which can be partially traced to spiritual aspects of life vs. the economic demands of a developing country. I discuss these tensions by drawing from both philosophical ideas, and snapshots of issues raised by students in class. I end with a brief discussion of the *educational* possibilities of Watsuji in countries like the Philippines.

Paper III

Maruyama Masao in the Philippine Context: Moving Past World War II

Karen Connie ABALOS-Orendain

Department of Philosophy, University of the Philippines

Abstract

Maruyama Masao can be appreciated by Filipino philosophy scholars in two conceptually different but politically related ways. First, as a critical assessor of the sentiments and thoughts of the Japanese people in relation to WWII. Second, as an academic who articulated the socio-political challenges facing Asian societies in the wake of modernity.

The former looks to the past. Introducing Maruyama's perspective on Japan's political system and its policies, which he claims to have influenced Japanese thought and behavior, may possibly shed light on the continued ponderings of Filipinos on the horrors brought about by the Second World War. In particular, his idea of *yokuatsu-ijo* (抑圧移譲; transfer of oppression) may prove illuminating.

The latter is situated in the present and the future. Like Japan, the Philippines struggles politically. The internal conflicts besetting the structures and thoughts of its people are partly due to a lack of objective framework. Not that the Philippines does not have any homegrown matrices but, in the grander scheme of political modernity, Maruyama has concepts that can help contextualize the problems of a nation forced to become one under the watchful eye of the West.

These two approaches towards Maruyama's work shows his relevance in contemporary political philosophy. Despite the fact that only some of his major works are available in English, he still has the potential to be a philosophical and political bridge to other Asian nations.

ODAGIRI Takushi (Respondent)
Institute of Liberal Arts and Science, Kanazawa University

Research Interests of the panel's members

Modern and contemporary Japanese philosophy, comparative philosophy, peace studies, philosophy of education, educational anthropology, socio-political philosophy, cosmopolitanism, applied Ethics on immigration and international Law.

Section 7A (Room 1073, 7/F, 1630-1830)

Moderator: Winnie SUNG, Nanyang Technological University

Paper I

中国古代における「仁」概念の展開

佐藤將之
台灣大学哲学系

Abstract

『論語』の徳目における核心概念であり、孔子が提唱したとされる「仁」は、儒教思想を理解する上で、長らくもっとも重要な概念と見なされてきた。しかし、そうした理解の前提にあったものは、『論語』の内容（少なくとも「仁」に関連した言説）が孔子の思想を代表しているという前提であり、近年、『郭店楚簡』など、多数の戦国楚簡の発掘によって、その用例の絶対年代が比較的信頼できる文献群が増加したことによって、「仁」概念が、当時の儒家思想において、必ずしも『論語』で取り上げられているほど核心的な位置にはない状況も分かってきている。本報告は、そうした現状を踏まえ、戦国楚簡思想文献における「仁」字とそれをめぐる言説の用例を精査し、その理解と論語の「仁」の用例との比較考察を行い、戦国時代初期から中期にいたる「仁」概念の展開の状況をより当時の実態に即して明らかにして生きたい。

*論文は原則、中国語で作成し、口頭発表は、状況により英語、中国語、韓国語及び日本語に対応します。

Research Interests

中國思想史、儒家思想、荀子、東亞政治哲學等

Paper II

Family Rituals in Contemporary Korea and Philosophical Implications

WANG Hwa Yeong
Sungkyun Institute for Confucian Studies and East Asian Philosophy,
Sungkyunkwan University

Abstract

This paper examines the current revival of rituals in Korea, focusing on family rituals, and its philosophical implications. Since its publication, Zhu Xi's *Family Rituals* has impacted on people's lives in East Asian Confucian societies. The *Family Rituals* re-established agnatic principles and the principles have imprinted an androcentric twist in not only in social practices but also on cosmological principles. Confucian family rituals prevailed gendered cosmology in Chosŏn Korea. Contemporary Korean society pertains the gendered cosmology of Confucian family rituals. The current research, however, lacks philosophical examination of contemporary practice, the revival of traditional forms, and their underlying meanings. Amongst the scarce sources, most research studies China. The paper explores the Confucian family rituals, remaining and revived, in the name of tradition, in contemporary Korea.

Through this paper, I will attempt to survey the contemporary practices of family rituals in Korea and reveal the underlying philosophy.

Research Interests

Confucian philosophy, Asian and comparative philosophy, feminist philosophy

Paper III Scaling the Wonder of *Satoyama*

Yi CHEN

Faculty of Society and Design, Bond University

Abstract

“Imagine a realm, where the season’s rhythms rule. Where centuries of agriculture and fishing have reshaped the land. Yet where people and nature remain in harmony.”¹ This is David Attenborough’s dream of *Satoyama* 里山,² a sustainable way of humane life in Japan’s rural foothills.

As much as the *Satoyama* realizes an innate human dream, as striking is its unassuming everydayness — there is nothing spectacular, but every individual act is based upon a tradition of care — and that care reflects back from the landscape to us: a single drop of water becomes significant, one falling leaf captures our attention, every tadpole is a miracle, cherished for its contribution to a man-nature system that is worshiped with reverence and gratitude. Masters of the Japanese arts often emphasize action that flows without intention. In *Satoyama*, such flow shapes a landscape. Centuries of experience beget a mode of cultivating the land that is balanced between mindful care and self-evident naturalness. Fishing and farming go hand in hand in a seasonal rhythm, yet with confident moderation, woodland that is both used and cultivated with a long-term plan that spans generations, every detail arises from the obvious: the place, the environment, the inhabitants, whether human, animal or plant, and time. But can such paradise of sustainability *scale* in a globalized society that has to confront crises — climate change, mass extinctions, an exploding population and an ever increasing economic and technological gap?

Attenborough’s narration of the BBC’s *Satoyama* documentary does not only treat us to spectacular views from a distance, but also the small details on a fisherman’s plate. We may meet Sangoro Tanaka, who is joined by his wife in an annual ritual to offer a plate with two live fish, fresh vegetables and other local delicacies at the family shrine, in sincere gratitude for nature’s abundance and generosity. Such ritual is certainly an expression of Japanese Shintoism. However, the two live fish, although a small detail, resonates with a remark of Confucius in the *Analects* when the Master noticed that one of his disciples “wanted to dispense with the sacrifice of a living sheep”,³ and he said to him, “[...] You value the sheep — I value ritual propriety (*li*)” (*Analects* 3.17).

¹ See David Attenborough’s BBC program: “*Satoyama*, Japan’s Secret Water Garden” (2008): https://v.youku.com/v_show/id_XMTg3MTI4NjU2.html?spm=a2h0k.11417342.soreults.dtitle. Retrieved May 9 2019.

² In Japanese, it means “villages where mountains give way to plains”, see the link *ibid*.

³ See the translation in Ames, Roger and Henry Rosemont Jr. (1999). *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation*. New York, U.S.A.: The Random House Publishing Group, p. 86.

Contrary to Buddhist doctrines that prohibit killing, the two live fish on Sangoro's sacrificial plate mark *Satoyama* not as a pastoral idyll of "intact" nature, nor established upon extinguishing nature's needs, nor upon external regulations. Rather, what we find is *Li* 禮, propriety, in its truest sense: based upon an empowered individual, acting in assured respect, offering trust through ritual and engaging the recipient of the offering in an expression of harmony, *zusammen musizieren*,⁴ playing music together through listening. Shinto emphasizes a pervasive web of animate spirits of nature and human beings alike, the Confucian concept *Li* 禮 derives such relationships from individual agency. In this sense, the *Satoyama* represents what is already within us, and as the number of individuals grows, as their needs grow, this agency, based on the simple principles of respect and care may scale with them, no matter how far from the Gifu mountains or the hills of Saitama.

Research Interests

Confucian philosophy, Japanese aesthetics, phenomenology; comparative literatures, philosophy of comparison

⁴ This is derived from the philosophy of the celebrated Italian conductor Claudio Abbado (1933-2014), who used the German phrase "*zusammen musizieren*" (literally: making music together) to describe an ideal of organizing a group of individuals into a unit that is able to perform in perfect harmony, at the highest level.

Section 7B (Room 1074, 7/F, 1630-1830)

Moderator: Yuko ISHIHARA, Ritsumeikan University

Organized Panel:

Skilled Performance and East Asian Wisdom Traditions

Panel Abstract

Drawing on insights from the various sources in the East Asian traditions from past to present, the panel hopes to shed light on the question of what it means to be “skilled” in specific contexts and what it may mean to be “skilled” in general. With good reason, recent discussions on the nature of skilled performance have moved away from the simple dichotomy of a self-conscious and intellectual act, on the one hand, and an automatic and dumb act, on the other hand. We have come to see that any adequate account must do justice to the distinct kind of “mindfulness” that is involved in skilled performance. As the expert swordsman engages in a duel, for example, the conceptual mind may not be in play, but a certain kind of acute awareness is certainly taking effect. Even when a person does not feel like she is the one doing the activity, this kind of “effortless” performance is still far from mindless coping. A few scholars have picked up on the apparent similarity between these descriptions and some of the ideas in the East Asian wisdom traditions, notably Zen Buddhism. For example, Krein and Ilundáin-Agurruza provide a comparative analysis of the phenomenon of *mushin* in relation to flow states. This panel aims at furthering this discussion on the relation between skilled performance and East Asian wisdom traditions. Participants bring together various perspectives ranging from early Mahayana Buddhism and Zen Buddhism to martial arts, Japanese performance art, and the Kyoto School tradition.

Paper I

The Monk, the Swordsman and the Freediver—A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Performance

Jesús ILUNDÁIN-AGURRUZA

Department of Philosophy, Linfield College

Abstract

Behold the following: a Sōtō Zen monk resolutely committed to *shikantaza*; an early Edo period samurai deadly deft in swordfights; and a freediver who playfully plunges dozens of meters deep into the ocean. In the face of it, we would be hard pressed to find meaningful similarities or informative differences among these. Yet, the premise of the presentation is, precisely, that by bringing such disparate pursuits together there are illuminating connections and revealing disparities to be found among them. The connecting thread is highly skilled performance.

Under such premise then, the comparison is carried out in light of Dōgen, whose ideas legitimize philosophically the soteriological role of praxis. Of special relevance is *munen* – interpreted in Dogen’s work as without-thinking, particularly when operationalized as *mushin* in the context of an embodied practice and performance that, in exemplary cases, results in improvisational and responsive virtuosity. Keen commentators of Dōgen’s work help contextualize its phenomenological application to dynamic performances beyond Zen Buddhism. Of note is that very interesting convergences and divergences come to the fore in relation to contemporary views on embodied cognition, specifically, enactive and situated stances in the context of high performance in sports, and martial and performing arts.

The result is that Zen, swordsmanship, and freediving – as concrete stand-ins for Buddhist practice, martial arts, and risk sports – afford a comparative and revealing analysis of “mentality,” embodiment, and skilled performance across East and West philosophical traditions.

Research Interests

Comparative philosophy, Japanese philosophy, phenomenology and philosophy of sport/performance

Paper II

‘Becoming the thing’: Nishida Kitarō on acting-intuition

Yuko ISHIHARA

College of Global Liberal Arts, Ritsumeikan University

Abstract

“Acting-intuition” (行為の直観, otherwise translated as “action-oriented intuition” and “enactive intuition”) was a key concept in Nishida Kitarō’s thought from the mid-1930s. Acting and intuition are usually understood as two opposing ways human beings relate to the environment. Action involves some kind of active principle such as our will whereas intuition or seeing is a passive reception of the surrounding. Nishida, however, took these terms to be co-implicative; acting entails seeing and seeing entails acting. According to Nishida, this co-implicative relation between acting and seeing applies globally to human interactions in the world, from our perception of objects to artistic creation and the formation of scientific knowledge. But what is particularly interesting is that for Nishida, acting-intuition was something that could be cultivated such that in the process, we let go of our subjective colorings and see and act according to the way things are *just as they are in themselves*. In Nishida’s words, we come to “see as the thing, act as the thing”. In this paper, I explore this cultivational aspect of acting-intuition that culminates in one’s ‘becoming the thing’ by examining the following two claims Nishida makes: namely that acting-intuition is a “form of *jikaku* (自覚, self-awareness)” and that “when the self becomes self-aware, the world becomes self-aware.” The former claim will help us understand acting-intuition as being cultivational since “*jikaku*” for Nishida denotes the dynamic movement of self-understanding whereby one ultimately comes to realize the absolute no-thingness of our being. The latter claim will challenge us to understand how ‘becoming the thing’ implies “the world becoming self-aware.”

Research Interests

Kyoto School tradition, phenomenology and comparative philosophy

Paper III
Mindfulness and Flow: A phenomenological study

Erol COPELJ
Department of Philosophy, Monash University

Abstract

This is a question frequently heard in contemporary discussion of mindfulness: is mindfulness identical to, or an example of a, “flow experience”, extraordinary states of mind that high performing athletes, and others, sometimes talk to us about? I will aim to show that mindfulness, the mental attitude that the Buddha of the Pali Cannon admonished us to nurture, is neither identical to nor it is a kind of flow experience.

To set the stage, I will begin by explicating an idea that will be familiar to most phenomenologists; the idea that there is an experience of possibilities. Two kinds of possibilities will play a key role in this talk. The first are projects: the possible states of the world that come into being through human beings, such as the possibility of writing this abstract, or of going for a stroll in the park. I contrast projects with ‘thingly possibilities’, the kind of possibilities that are intrinsic to the phenomena themselves.

On this basis, I develop a description of mindfulness as the feeling of being tuned-in to thingly possibilities (and being tuned out of projects). But there is also another form of mindfulness, the feeling of being tuned in to one’s *present* projects (and being tuned out of one’s absent projects). This latter kind of mindfulness opens up the possibility of narrowing down the horizon of one’s present projects to a single project, in which one then becomes absorbed. To nurture this possibility is to nurture a kind of *concentration*. And, I think, this is what people have in mind when they speak of “flow experience”. If that is right, then not only is flow not the right kind of mindfulness, it is not mindfulness at all, it is a kind of concentration.

Research Interests

Phenomenology and Buddhism

Paper IV
Skilled Interactions and Natural Movements in Japanese Puppetry

Haruka OKUI
Department of Social Studies, Doshisha University

Abstract

This paper examines how a traditional skilled performance of Japanese *Bunraku* puppetry performs natural movements on stage. The notion of nature in East Asian philosophical contexts, especially with regard to traditional body practices, evokes a sense of tension with “skilled” works; the “natural” is often a result of artificial skills. Although Kleist (1810) depicted the “perfect beauty” of the marionette’s movements regarding physical law without any artificial intentions, the *Bunraku* puppeteers are careful to never eliminate the importance of thorough skill. In this case the puppeteer’s sophisticated skill conceals the skill itself; the audiences are treated to the illusion that the puppets are functioning by themselves on stage—not attached to any puppeteers’ works. Recent phenomenological perspectives regarding performative awareness or body schema have contributed toward creating relatively accurate descriptions for this contradictory system. This paper utilizes interview and observation data from *Bunraku* puppetry to describe the entangled manipulation system in which three puppeteers manipulate

a single puppet together. Second, it elucidates the puppeteers' experiences of manipulating the puppet's body and interacting with each other according to their respective given roles. Third, it considers the relationship between their skills and the natural movements their puppets produce on stage. Using puppetry as an example of phenomenological description, this paper illuminates not only this particular practice but also the dynamics of our bodies, which can enliven our "being-in-the-world."

Research Interests

Philosophy of Education, Phenomenology, Performing Arts

Paper V

"Doing excellent" without knowing what to do: A Japanese Zen Buddhist critique of intellectualism

Katsunori MIYAHARA

School of Liberal Arts, University of Wollongong

Abstract

This talk aims to develop a cross-cultural critique of intellectualist accounts of skilled performance drawing on insights from the Japanese *Dō* tradition. I start by describing the intellectualist view. Thanks to Gilbert Ryle, many think that skilled performance relies on non-propositional knowledge-how. However, intellectualists contend that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that; hence, expert skilled performance always relies on propositional knowledge. I then introduce an alternative to intellectualism: a Zen Buddhist account developed in the Japanese *Dō* tradition. The Japanese account considers skilled performance at its best as dependent on the *mind of no-mind* (無心, *Mushin*), an empty state of mind that contains nothing. This poses a challenge to intellectualism: One cannot attain an empty state of mind while entertaining a proposition; thus, from this perspective, intellectualists are unable to account for peak performances of skilled experts. Next, I consider a possible response from the intellectualists: They might attempt to accommodate the Japanese account by regarding it as only dealing with the surface phenomenology of skilled performances; the intellectualist account complements it by plugging in a metaphysical account of their real nature. I call this the *superficiality response*. Finally, I offer a series of objections to the superficiality response. The objections concern the intellectualist's ability to account for some characters of skilled performance as depicted in the Japanese account, namely, its specificity, normativity, and the significance of emotional attunement.

Research Interests

Phenomenology, Pragmatism, Japanese Philosophy, Enactivism

Section 7C (Room 1083, 8/F, 1630-1830)

Moderator: Giulia FALATO, University of Oxford

Organized Panel:

In the interstices of "religion" and "philosophy":

The introduction and reception of Western categories and thoughts in imperial and modern China

Panel Abstract

Philosophy and religion are the main pillars upon which the intellectual dialogue between China and the West has been based over the past three centuries. These categories were used interchangeably for a long period of time as part of the introduction of Western knowledge into China until the second half of the nineteenth century, when the Chinese and Western societies became secularised. Drawing on four chronologically ordered case studies, this panel will provide a diachronic account of how these two disciplines were entangled, how they were exploited by different western actors and received by Chinese interlocutors. In particular, Dr Canaris and Dr Falato's papers will look at the dawn of sino-western philosophical dialogue (16th-17th centuries). Dr Canaris will discuss Michele Ruggieri S.J.'s contribution (1543-1607) to the creation of an ethical concordance between two intellectually discrepant traditions, while Dr Falato will analyse how the Jesuit teachings were received and integrated into local Confucian practices. Mr Tay will focus on the 19th century's protestant missionaries, their interpretation of Chinese religion(s) and how its alleged materialism was used in contrast to Christian spiritualism. Finally, Dr Gatta's contribution will analyse the reception and impact of western philosophy, specifically of Kant's doctrine, on 20th century intellectuals. Ultimately, the purpose of this panel is to highlight the epistemological and ontological gaps between Chinese and Western civilizations and the role philosophy and religion played in building a bridge across those conceptual spaces.

Paper I

Ethics as a strategy for cultural accommodation in Ruggieri's *Tianzhu shilu* 天主實錄 (True Record of the Lord of Heaven)

Daniel CANARIS

Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University

Abstract

When the Jesuits first arrived in China in the twilight of the Ming dynasty, they quickly realised that the missionary strategies employed in other fields such as India and the Americas would not be effective in China. Rather than impose Christianity by force or treat the Chinese as unlettered savages, the Jesuits sought to dialogue between the intellectual traditions of East and West by accommodating Confucian doctrines and rituals to Christianity. This missionary strategy has long been eponymous with Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), though its roots lie in the Jesuit experience in Japan and the insights of Ricci's long neglected forebear in China, Michele Ruggieri (1543-1607). This paper will look more closely at the inception of the China mission by examining the first European work printed in Chinese, Ruggieri's *Tianzhu shilu* 天主實錄 (*True Record of the Lord of Heaven*). In particular, it will explore Ruggieri's hesitations about constructing a rational concordance between disparate intellectual traditions. Instead, Ruggieri appealed to shared ethical perspectives that in his view were not culturally contingent but

universally valid. He portrayed his missionary activity as the fulfilment of Confucian norms, even stressing that many Christian moral precepts were highly valued in China and in some instances more perfectly practised than in war-ravaged Europe. As a conclusion, this paper will consider the legacy of the *Tianzhu shilu* in Ricci's more famous *Tianzhu shiyi* 天主實義 (*The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*) and the tensions between their respective missionary approaches.

Research Interests

Philosophy of the Italian Enlightenment, Giambattista Vico, Reception and image of China in early modern Europe, Jesuit China mission

Paper II

Integrating European moral philosophy to Chinese traditional practices: the cases of Li Jiugong 李九功's *Lixiu yijian* 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror for encouraging cultivation) and Han Lin 韓霖's *Duoshu* 鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell)

Giulia FALATO

China Centre, University of Oxford

Abstract

During the 17th century, 470 works on religious and philosophical topics were composed by Western missionaries in China and by Chinese converts. In an attempt to present European moral philosophy in a way that was compatible with Confucianism, the authors emphasised aspects that the two traditions had in common and aptly blended core precepts in the Chinese cultural milieu. Among the literary productions that contributed to the introduction of European knowledge to the late-Ming/early-Qing literati, a particular genre stands out: "wisdom literature". This comprised literary works that emphasised moral teachings over Christian themes and were similar to the widely popular *shanshu* 善書 (moral books). This contribution will investigate the reception of European moral philosophy and its integration with traditional Chinese practices by focusing on two relevant publications as case studies: Han Lin 韓霖's (1601-1644) *Duoshu* 鐸書 (The Book of the Warning Bell), which was published in Shanxi in 1641; and Li Jiugong 李九功's (d. 1681) *Lixiu yijian* 勵修一鑑 (A Mirror for encouraging cultivation), which was published in Fujian around 1645. Despite displaying differences in their format, style and aim, these two texts demonstrate how Western philosophical precepts could be applied to everyday practices of moral cultivation and used to reinforce core Confucian values such as humanity '*ren* 仁' or filial piety '*xiao* 孝'. They also provide an interesting insight into how missionary publications and moral precepts circulated among different communities.

Research Interests

History of sino-western cultural relations, Jesuit China mission, Introduction and reception of Western moral philosophy in late-Ming/early-Qing, modern Chinese lexicography

Paper III
Protestant Invention of Chinese Religion(s) in the Nineteenth Century

Wei Leong TAY
Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Oxford

Abstract

The term “religion” has recently been undergoing critical analysis and historicization by scholars. Religion is not a transhistorical and universal phenomena, but a unique product of Western/Christian history, which was globalized in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by Western empires and missionary societies. Protestant missionaries were instrumental in translating the native Chinese traditions of *Ru*, *Shi* 釋 and *Dao* 道 into Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. To nineteenth century westerners, religion was an a priori knowledge and all nations, even primitive ones, had religion. However, Protestant Christianity is the only universal and true religion. The essence of religion is defined by Protestantism as inner piety and beliefs and Protestant missionaries were motivated to study Chinese religion(s) to decode the “Chinese mind” and facilitate the religious conversion of the natives and comprehension of Chinese culture. This paper examines Protestant missionary construction of Chinese religion(s) as “materialistic.” The materialism of Chinese religious beliefs contrasted unfavourably to the spiritualism of Christianity. The Chinese thinking was deemed as fixated on the concrete and unable to derive the metaphysical and spiritual truths of science and Christianity in the West. This account for the arrested intellectual development of the Chinese and their rampant superstitions, and the stagnation of the Chinese civilization in comparison with the West. The discovery of Chinese religion(s) by the Protestants in the nineteenth century served the European desire to master the strange and exotic Chinese civilization so as to open China up for the conquest of Western Christianity, commerce, and imperialism.

Research Interests

History of Chinese religions, Chinese nationalism, Chinese intellectual history and religious thoughts, social history of Chinese rebellion and China’s modern revolution

Paper IV
Immanuel Kant’s influence on modern Chinese philosophy

Timon GATTA
Institute of Oriental Studies, Sapienza University of Rome

Abstract

Immanuel Kant was among the first Western philosophers to be introduced in modern China and had great influence and impact on the development of contemporary Chinese thought. From the beginning of the 20th century, Kant’s philosophy represented a real challenge for Chinese thinkers, both in the religious-metaphysical and ethical fields. Kant’s theories regarding the conditions, limitations and possibilities of human knowledge – the main focus of his Critique of Pure Reason – were perceived as a “threat” to the legitimacy and validity of Chinese ethical and philosophical maxims, particularly the Confucian ones. Kant’s ethical system, based on the categorical imperative, consists of a moral code independent from any sort of religious, metaphysical, social or political justification. As Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 said: “if Kant is right, then the very idea of a Chinese philosophy, together with its modern developments, would be impossible”. Therefore, to ensure the legitimacy and validity of Chinese traditional thought and

theory, many Chinese intellectuals set themselves the objective to “solve” the Kantian issue, in order to preserve Chinese philosophy from the potentially destructive consequences of Kant’s criticism. This paper will illustrate how different intellectuals and thinkers in 20th century China approached Kant’s philosophy and attempted to adapt it to Chinese theoretical patterns and to use it to modernize Chinese thought. In particular, it will focus on the so-called modern Neoconfucianism and on prominent intellectuals such as Wang Guowei 王國維, Li Zehou 李澤厚, and Mou Zongsan.

Research Interests

Modern Chinese philosophical lexicon, Introduction and reception of Western philosophy in China, Introduction of Kant and German philosophy in China and their influence on modern Chinese philosophy and Chinese vocabulary

Section 7D (Room 1085, 8/F, 1630-1830)

Moderator: Soonyi LEE, Mercy College

Paper I

Beyond Reciprocity: The Golden Rule in Christianity and Mohism

Joseph Emmanuel STA. MARIA (Pronounced “Santa Maria”)
Department of Philosophy, Ateneo De Manila University, Philippines

Abstract

I wish to create a rapport between the Christian golden rule and its counterpart from Mohist philosophy, using Paul Ricoeur’s reading of the aforesaid Christian golden rule as an interpretive lens. In his article, “The Golden Rule and Religion,” Ricoeur says that the golden rule operates under the human logic of equivalence and because of this it is susceptible to being used for selfish ends. This means that someone following the “logic of equivalence” interpretation of the Golden Rule, might merely do good to another just to be paid back. However, Ricoeur argues that Christ’s command to love one’s enemies serves as a corrective to the golden rule by appropriating the aforesaid rule in God’s logic of superabundance. In other words, one should no longer practice the rule in order to be paid back but as a response to God’s excessive generosity. I wish to show that something analogous to this relation between the logic of equivalence and the logic of superabundance exists in the philosophy of the *Mozi*. Specifically, according to Carine Defoort, the *Mozi*’s concept of inclusive care was initially a moral imperative in which one extended care beyond one’s traditional relations of reciprocity to include others that can also reciprocate one’s care. However, inclusive care eventually evolved into a more impartial form in which one should extend care to all regardless of their capacity to reciprocate, in imitation of and gratitude to Heaven and its excessive beneficence.

Research Interests:

Classical Chinese philosophy, Christian philosophy, Ancient Greek philosophy, virtue ethics, personalism, philosophy of mysticism

Paper II

Kyokutei Bakin and *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*

DING Yiruo
Department of Japanese Studies
The Chinese University of Hongkong

Abstract

Kyokutei Bakin (1767-1848) was one of the most popular writers in Edo Japan (1603-1868). Being a lover of Chinese novels, he absorbed elements of Chinese novels into his own writings. The paper focuses on the relationships between Kyokutei Bakin’s popular writings and the Four Great Masterpieces in China, namely, *The Water Margin*, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, *The Journey to the West*, and *The Golden Lotus*.

The *Romance of the Three Kingdoms* is the first of the four great stories to be circulated in the Edo period. Kyokutei Bakin also incorporates the plot and thoughts of the *Romances of the Three Kingdoms* in his own novels. He is deeply influenced by its classic ideas.

Its reference to orthodoxy is reflected in the various details of his novels, which can be a glimpse of Bakin’s understanding of Tokugawa’s dual power. Along with the increasing

clearness of the position of the imperial power and the Buke regime, Bakins's reflection may not be only his personal will, but a trend of thought spread at the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate period.

This paper begins with his interpretation of orthodoxy which is embodied in the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*. The first is to discuss the imperial orthodoxy from his novels and the second is to expound the position of Buke from his points.

Research Interests

The study on Kyokutei Bakin's *Remake of the Four Great Masterpieces in China* is significant: first, it helps understand the diversity of Edo culture in the lens of Edo literature and China-Japan cultural exchanges. Second, it shows the domestication of Chinese thought within the Japanese cultural framework. Kyokutei Bakin's works not only used elements of Chinese novels, but also borrowed ideas from Chinese Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Third, it demonstrates the intellectual climate in the Kansei era. Even in time of tightening cultural policy, Edo authors could find space for creative works. Kyokutei Bakin and his relationship with Chinese novels is an important but little-studied topic. This study will fill in the academic gap in Sino-Japanese studies.

Paper III

Zen kōan Analysis: Past, Present, and Future

Eiji SUHARA

School of International Letters and Cultures
Arizona State University

Abstract

In the past, Zen kōan have been classified into several different types by scholars: a shocking method to break the "thinking mode," intentionally paradoxical to lead one to a "great doubt," object of meditative focus, expression of an enlightened mind, etc.

However, the above arguments are often proceeded without a skeptical attitude towards the abstract concepts used in kōan. For example, linguistic expressions such as “無 (nothingness)” or “仏性 (buddha nature)” in “Zhaozhou's Dog” kōan can be “understood” only through various embodied experiences associated with bodily experiences. However, when a practitioner tackles a kōan without a self-reflective awareness of such an insight, it remains a mere “habitual mental activity while attaching to semantic meanings.”

There have been, however, in present academia, initiated by Prof. Slingerland, several research studies that have tried to resolve the above issue by analyzing East Asian Philosophical texts while using a conceptual metaphor theory. This work not only follows the paths of such predecessors and provides different angles to read zen kōan through the lens of embodied realism, but also reveals a unique feature of kōan that leads the practitioner to an insight into something "non-referable" by recognizing the limitation of the function of language through linguistic expressions (which sounds contradictory).

Nevertheless, during the analyses, this work also raises several methodological and theoretical issues, such as "how can we experience a mentality beyond language-attached embodied experience we have never had," etc. that need to be investigated in the future.

過去の研究において禅公案は以下のような様々なカテゴリーに分類されてきた。“思量”を打ち破るショッキングなきっかけ、その矛盾的構造によって修行者を“大疑団”に導く方法、禅師と弟子の間のコミュニケーションを可能にする道具、修行者を瞑想に導く対象、禅師による悟りの表現など。

しかしながら、これらの議論は公案において使われる抽象的な言語表現に対しての懐疑的態度が見られないままたびたび考察が進められている。例えば“趙州狗子”公案における“無”や“仏性”などといった表現は様々な身体的受肉経験を基にして始めて“理解”可能になる概念であり、実践者がそのことを省みずに公案に取り組んでも、それはあくまでも“言語に執着した習慣的な”行為に留まる。

その点を補うのがSlingerland教授に始まり東洋哲学のテキストを概念メタファーの観点から分析するいくつかの研究である。この論文では既存のいくつかの研究を参考にしながら方法論として概念メタファーを使用していくつかの禅公案を分析する。しかし本論のユニークな点は、そうすることによって公案の解釈において今までとは違った視点を提供するという所にとどまらず、言語的表現を使用しながらその限界を認知することによって“志向され得ない”何かに対する洞察をもたらすという禅公案の特徴を明らかにすることにある。

さらに、“どうやって言語を通じた受肉的经验としてではない、今までに経験したことのない精神状態を体験する事が可能なのか”といったような、分析の過程で出てくる方法論的そして理論的問題点について将来的に考察されるべき問題点を挙げることにする。

Research Interests

Analysis of Zen kōan and other East Asian Philosophical texts using a conceptual metaphor theory and reconsidering East Asian Philosophical concepts from multi-dimensional perspectives, using plural methodological insights from Japanese scholarship (philology and history) and "Western" scholarship (German phenomenology, Philosophy of mind, cognitive linguistics, and cognitive science).